CVE-2026-99536 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests

A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left over from an earlier command.

Limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages during message validation, before smb2_sess_setup() can replace work->sess. Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing validation error path returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER and stops processing the remaining commands.

This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing session, tree or response encryption handling.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026

The ksmbd implementation in the Linux kernel contained a critical logic flaw within its handling of SMB2 compound requests involving multichannel session binding. In network file sharing protocols like Server Message Block (SMB), clients often bundle multiple commands into a single packet to improve performance and reduce latency, a technique known as command chaining or compounding. The vulnerability arises from the kernel's management of work items during these complex transactions. Specifically, when a multichannel binding operation fails, the system retains the target session on the associated work item to ensure that any subsequent error response can be properly signed with the correct cryptographic keys. However, this retention mechanism creates a state leakage scenario where residual session context persists beyond its intended scope.

This retained session information becomes dangerous because it allows subsequent commands within the same compound request or in immediately following requests to incorrectly utilize that stale session identifier alongside tree connections left over from earlier operations. Essentially, an attacker can manipulate the sequence of commands such that they exploit this lingering state to bind a new channel to a session context that should have been discarded due to failure. This breaks the isolation boundaries between different logical sessions and connection states within the server's processing pipeline. The flaw effectively allows for improper association of resources, which undermines the integrity checks designed to prevent unauthorized access or state confusion during complex negotiation sequences.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it can lead to session hijacking scenarios where an attacker gains control over a valid user session by exploiting the misbinding mechanism. By carefully crafting compound requests that trigger the failed binding path and then immediately issue commands relying on the retained session, an adversary could potentially access files or resources associated with different users or administrative privileges they do not possess. This represents a severe breach of confidentiality and integrity within the SMB service, as it allows for unauthorized lateral movement or privilege escalation depending on how the compromised session is utilized by subsequent application logic.

To mitigate this risk, the fix implements strict validation rules that limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages only during message validation phases. This check occurs before the smb2_sess_setup function can replace the work item's session pointer with a new one, thereby preventing the stale state from propagating into compound sequences. The solution explicitly checks for NextCommand indicators and current request offsets to cover all possible positions of binding commands within a compound sequence, whether they appear at the beginning, middle, or end. By enforcing this separation, the system ensures that failed bindings do not leave residual session contexts available for reuse in subsequent chained operations.

This remediation intentionally restricts support for compounded binding operations because such complexity is not strictly required by the SMB protocol specification. The update preserves existing behavior for standalone binding and non-binding compound requests, ensuring that normal operational workflows remain unaffected while closing the specific attack vector related to state leakage during failed multichannel negotiations. This approach aligns with security best practices of minimizing complex state transitions in network protocols to reduce the surface area for logic-based exploits.

From a classification perspective, this vulnerability is categorized under CWE-362, which describes concurrent execution using shared resources with inadequate synchronization, specifically manifesting here as improper session binding and resource reuse. In terms of attack patterns, it relates to ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, where an attacker might leverage misconfigured or compromised authentication sessions to maintain persistence or escalate privileges within the network environment. The fix ensures that session state is correctly isolated per request context, preventing the cross-contamination of security contexts during high-throughput compound operations.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00104

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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