CVE-2026-99555 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: usbtv: fix null-pointer dereference on disconnect

A null-pointer dereference can occur in usb_make_path() when called from usbtv_querycap() (and other ioctl handlers) during device disconnection.

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057]
RIP: 0010:usb_make_path include/linux/usb.h:985 [inline]
RIP: 0010:usbtv_querycap+0x9c/0x100 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-video.c:612 ... Call Trace: <TASK> v4l_querycap+0x236/0x470 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:1106 __video_do_ioctl+0x8af/0xc70 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3133 video_usercopy+0x860/0x1430 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3475 v4l2_ioctl+0x18d/0x1e0 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:366 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94

This happens due to a race condition between the USB device disconnect routine (usbtv_disconnect()) and V4L2 ioctls. When the device is disconnected, usbtv_disconnect() sets usbtv->udev = NULL without holding the usbtv->v4l2_lock mutex. Concurrently, an ioctl handler like usbtv_querycap() can be executing under the v4l2_lock and attempt to use usbtv->udev, leading to a crash.

To fix this, move the usbtv->udev = NULL assignment into usbtv_video_free() and protect it with mutex_lock(&usbtv->v4l2_lock). This ensures that no non-queue ioctl handler can run concurrently with the pointer being nullified. If an ioctl is already running, the mutex will block the disconnect path until the ioctl finishes. If an ioctl is blocked waiting for the lock, it will acquire it after the disconnect routine releases it, but will then check video_is_registered() (which was cleared by vb2_video_unregister_device()) and safely return -ENODEV.

Acquiring v4l2_lock after vb2_video_unregister_device() avoids reintroducing a historical deadlock issue, and usbtv_audio_free() remains safe as it is called before usbtv_video_free().

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The Linux kernel vulnerability identified in the media: usbtv driver involves a critical null-pointer dereference that occurs during device disconnection. This flaw manifests when the usb_make_path function, invoked from ioctl handlers such as usbtv_querycap or other similar entry points, attempts to access the USB device structure after it has been logically removed but before proper synchronization is established. The resulting system failure presents as a general protection fault with KASAN reporting a null-pointer dereference in a non-canonical address range. This crash disrupts kernel stability and can lead to denial of service for local users who trigger this race condition through ioctl calls while the physical USB device is being unplugged or disconnected from the host system.

The root cause of this vulnerability lies in a race condition between the USB device disconnect routine, specifically usbtv_disconnect(), and concurrent V4L2 ioctls. When the hardware is detached, the disconnect handler sets the usbtv->udev pointer to NULL without acquiring the v4l2_lock mutex that protects other parts of the driver state. Simultaneously, a user-space application may execute an ioctl command like VIDIOC_QUERYCAP, which runs under the protection of v4l2_lock and attempts to read or manipulate the now-null usbtv->udev pointer. Because the disconnect path does not wait for ongoing ioctls to complete before nullifying the device structure, it creates a window where concurrent access leads to an invalid memory reference and subsequent kernel panic.

This issue is classified under CWE-416: Use After Free, as the code attempts to use a pointer after its associated resource has been invalidated or removed from active management. In terms of attack vectors, this aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter if an attacker leverages local privilege escalation via kernel exploitation, though primarily it represents a reliability flaw exploitable for denial-of-service by any unprivileged user capable of opening the device node and issuing ioctls during disconnection. The lack of proper synchronization between state changes in the disconnect path and concurrent ioctl execution violates fundamental concurrency safety principles required for robust driver design.

The resolution involves restructuring the cleanup sequence to ensure atomicity and mutual exclusion around critical pointer updates. Specifically, the assignment of usbtv->udev = NULL is moved from usbtv_disconnect() into usbtv_video_free(). This operation is then protected by acquiring the v4l2_lock mutex before nullifying the pointer. This change guarantees that no ioctl handler can execute concurrently with the moment the device structure becomes invalid. If an ioctl is currently running, it will complete its execution while holding the lock, after which the disconnect path proceeds to free resources safely. Conversely, if an ioctl is waiting for the lock, it will acquire it only after the disconnect routine has finished and released the mutex, at which point it checks video_is_registered() to determine that the device is no longer available and returns -ENODEV gracefully rather than crashing.

Furthermore, this fix carefully avoids reintroducing historical deadlock issues by acquiring v4l2_lock only after vb2_video_unregister_device() has been called. This ordering ensures that the unregister process completes its internal synchronization before any new locks are taken in the cleanup phase. Additionally, usbtv_audio_free() remains safe because it is invoked prior to usbtv_video_free(), ensuring that audio-related resources do not depend on the video device structure during their own teardown. These measures collectively restore thread safety and prevent kernel panics caused by race conditions between hardware detachment and software ioctl processing.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00157

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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