CVE-2026-99602 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: don't let the extent type hide an exhausted free-space table extent
udf_table_new_block() takes the first block of the free-space table extent closest to the goal. It keeps that extent's type and length together in goal_elen, subtracts one block, and deletes the extent only if goal_elen then reaches zero. UDF 2.60 section 2.3.7.1 requires the free-space extents of an Unallocated Space Entry to be of type 1 (allocated but not recorded), and mkudffs writes them that way. For such an extent the type bits keep goal_elen non-zero, so taking its last block leaves a type-1 extent of length zero behind, starting at the block after the extent, which is in use.
The next allocation that picks this empty extent returns that in-use block. Subtracting a block from 0x40000000 then borrows from the type bits, and the extent becomes type 0 with a length of 2^30 - blocksize: about a gigabyte of "free" space overlapping live metadata, the other table extents and whatever lies behind the partition. From then on blocks are handed out twice, or past the end of the partition.
Extents that udf_table_free_blocks() adds are type 0, where the check works, so only tables written by mkudffs or by another implementation are affected. Nothing more than filling such a filesystem is needed: on a fresh 1 MiB "mkudffs --space=unalloctable" image, creating empty files until the partition is full writes file entries over the reserve volume descriptor sequence and the backup anchor, and df then reports a negative amount of used space.
On syzbot's images the same double allocation is what the two reports below trip over. In the first, ftruncate() extends a new file with enough hole extents to need a chain of allocation extent descriptors; one AED is placed on another inode's file entry, and a later one is placed on the block of the AED currently being filled, which udf_setup_indirect_aext() zeroes, so __udf_add_aext() finds lengthAllocDescs out of step with its cursor. In the second, an AED is placed past the end of the device, sb_getblk() fails, and the error path of udf_do_extend_file() calls udf_truncate_extents() on an extent list that no longer covers i_size.
Keep the type separately from the length, as udf_table_prealloc_blocks() already does.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/21/2026
The Linux kernel UDF filesystem driver contains a critical logic flaw in its block allocation mechanism for free-space tables, specifically within the udf_table_new_block function. This vulnerability arises from an incorrect handling of extent type and length fields during the deallocation or splitting of extents. The code currently stores both the extent's type and remaining length together in a single variable called goal_elen. When allocating a block, it subtracts one from this combined value and only deletes the extent if the result reaches zero. This approach fails to account for the specific requirements of UDF 2.60 section 2.3.7.1, which mandates that free-space extents in an Unallocated Space Entry must be of type 1, indicating allocated but not recorded status. File systems created by mkudffs adhere strictly to this standard, resulting in extent entries where the high-order bits represent the type and lower bits represent length.
The core technical failure occurs when the last block of a free-space table extent is allocated. Because the type bits remain set in goal_elen even after subtracting one from the length, the value does not reach zero. Consequently, instead of deleting the now-empty extent, the kernel retains it as an extent with a length of zero but retaining its non-zero type identifier. This creates a malformed state where a zero-length extent exists immediately following valid data blocks. The subsequent allocation operation that selects this empty extent incorrectly interprets the remaining bits in goal_elen. Specifically, subtracting one from a value like 0x40000000 causes a borrow into the type field due to integer underflow behavior within the combined variable structure. This arithmetic error transforms the extent's type to zero and inflates its length to approximately two gigabytes minus the block size.
This corruption results in severe memory safety issues, primarily double allocation of blocks and out-of-bounds access. The kernel begins handing out blocks that are already in use by live metadata or other table extents. This leads to data corruption as file entries overwrite reserve volume descriptor sequences and backup anchors on fresh images. In more complex scenarios involving large files with many hole extents, the corrupted extent descriptors can be written onto unrelated inodes. For instance, an Allocation Extent Descriptor may be placed over another inode's file entry or even over a block currently being filled by another allocation operation. This causes internal inconsistencies where lengthAllocDescs becomes out of step with its cursor during udf_setup_indirect_aext operations.
The operational impact includes filesystem corruption and potential kernel instability. When an Allocation Extent Descriptor is placed past the end of the device, sb_getblk fails to retrieve the block. The error handling path in udf_do_extend_file then calls udf_truncate_extents on a corrupted extent list that no longer accurately reflects the inode size i_size. This can lead to further logical errors and potential denial of service conditions. Additionally, standard tools like df may report negative amounts of used space due to the miscalculation of free versus allocated blocks caused by these overlapping extents. The vulnerability is specific to file systems created with mkudffs or similar implementations that strictly follow UDF 2.60 standards for unallocated table spaces, as other implementations might use type zero which does not trigger this specific arithmetic flaw.
To mitigate this issue, the kernel developers have modified udf_table_new_block to keep the extent type separate from its length during allocation operations. This change aligns with how udf_table_prealloc_blocks already handles these fields, ensuring that decrementing the remaining block count does not inadvertently affect or borrow into the type bits. By decoupling these values, the kernel correctly identifies when an extent is fully consumed and deletes it appropriately without leaving behind malformed zero-length extents. This fix prevents the arithmetic underflow that leads to massive false free space reports and subsequent double allocations. The vulnerability maps to CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound due to the improper handling of combined bit fields, and CWE-682 Incorrect Calculation which results in out-of-bounds memory access. From a tactical perspective, this relates to ATT&CK technique T1499 Endpoint Denial of Service via resource exhaustion through filesystem corruption, although primarily it represents a data integrity risk rather than an immediate exploit vector for remote code execution without additional conditions.