CVE-2026-99607 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext2: preserve IOMAP_F_DIRTY for extending direct writes
ext2_iomap_begin() sets IOMAP_F_DIRTY for writes that may extend i_size, but clears the flag after ext2_get_blocks(). When the write uses an existing mapped block, iomap can then use FUA and skip generic_write_sync(), even though ext2_dio_write_end_io() updates the inode size. An O_DSYNC write can therefore return without persisting the new size.
For example, on a FUA-capable device, a 512-byte O_DIRECT|O_DSYNC write at offset 512 into a fsynced one-byte file returns successfully and extends the in-memory size to 1024, while an immediate read of the on-disk inode still shows size 1. An explicit fsync persists the new size.
Move setting of IOMAP_F_DIRTY after the initialization.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2023-something in the Linux kernel's ext2 filesystem driver stems from a race condition and logic error within the direct I/O path, specifically during write operations that extend the file size on storage devices capable of Fused Write (FUA) commands. The core technical flaw resides in the ext2_iomap_begin function, which is responsible for preparing block mappings for I/O operations. When initiating a write that may increase the inode's i_size attribute, this function correctly sets the IOMAP_F_DIRTY flag to indicate that metadata changes are pending and must be synchronized before completion. However, subsequent calls to ext2_get_blocks, which resolves the actual disk blocks for the data being written, inadvertently clear this critical dirty flag if it determines that existing mapped blocks are sufficient or under specific internal state conditions. This premature clearing of the IOMAP_F_DIRTY flag creates a dangerous discrepancy between the in-memory representation of the file and its persistent on-disk state when interacting with hardware features like FUA.
The operational impact is severe for applications relying on data integrity guarantees provided by O_DSYNC or O_DIRECT flags, which are commonly used in databases and critical transactional systems to ensure that written data reaches stable storage before returning control to the application. Under normal circumstances, a write operation extending file size should trigger a synchronization of metadata to guarantee consistency. However, due to the cleared flag, the generic I/O mapping layer interprets the absence of the dirty bit as an indication that no special sync is required for metadata changes. Consequently, on FUA-capable devices, the kernel utilizes the hardware's ability to force write-through caching mechanisms and skips the execution of generic_write_sync(). This function is typically responsible ensuring that inode updates are flushed to disk alongside data blocks. As a result, the application receives an acknowledgment that the write has completed successfully, implying full durability, while in reality only the new data payload was persisted; the updated file size remains uncommitted on the storage medium until an explicit fsync system call forces a metadata flush later.
This behavior leads to silent data corruption scenarios where recovery after a crash or power loss results in truncated files that appear valid but lack their expected length, potentially causing application failures or logic errors downstream. For instance, if a database writes a record at offset 512 extending the file from one byte to ten bytes, and then crashes before an explicit fsync occurs, the recovered file will still show a size of one byte despite containing new data starting at that offset. This violates the POSIX semantics expected by O_DSYNC users who assume atomicity between data persistence and metadata updates. The issue is particularly insidious because it does not manifest on all hardware configurations; it specifically targets systems with FUA support, making it difficult to reproduce in standard testing environments lacking such storage controllers or where default caching policies mask the underlying inconsistency.
Mitigation strategies involve both immediate patching of the kernel source and architectural adjustments for high-assurance applications. The primary resolution involves modifying ext2_iomap_begin to ensure that IOMAP_F_DIRTY is set after all block mapping initialization steps are complete, thereby preventing its accidental clearance by subsequent helper functions like ext2_get_blocks. This ensures the flag remains active throughout the write operation, forcing the generic_write_sync path to execute and persist inode changes even when FUA hardware acceleration is utilized. For organizations unable to immediately patch their kernels, applying strict fsync calls after every critical write operation that extends file size can serve as a workaround, although this incurs significant performance penalties. Furthermore, adopting storage configurations with weaker caching guarantees or disabling FUA features at the controller level may reduce risk but impacts overall I/O throughput. Long-term resilience requires adherence to industry standards such as CWE-362 for race conditions and aligning with MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to persistence mechanisms that rely on file system integrity, ensuring that security controls do not inadvertently introduce reliability flaws in critical infrastructure components.