CVE-2026-99793 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Only accept connection responses to outstanding requests
An outgoing channel waits in BT_CONNECT until security and the feature mask exchange complete, and only then sends its connection request. A peer can answer it before that with a connection response matching our source CID. The channel then moves to BT_CONFIG, completes configuration and becomes connected before security has completed. If security then fails, l2cap_security_cfm() leaves the connected channel alone, so it stays up on a link that did not reach the required security level.
A connection response with a zero source CID is matched by identifier. Another channel can hold the same identifier for a response it still has to send, so the lookup can pick the wrong channel.
Only accept a connection response while our request is outstanding, and only look at such channels when matching by identifier.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/22/2026
The vulnerability in question resides within the Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) protocol stack implementation of the Linux kernel, specifically affecting the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol layer known as L2CAP. This component serves as a critical intermediary between higher-level application protocols and lower-layer transport mechanisms, managing logical channels that facilitate data exchange over Bluetooth connections. The core issue stems from an improper state machine transition during the connection establishment process for outgoing channels. When initiating a new channel, the kernel places the connection in a BT_CONNECT state, waiting for both security authentication to complete and feature mask exchanges to finish before sending the actual connection request packet. However, the implementation fails to strictly validate that incoming connection responses correspond only to requests currently outstanding from this specific local endpoint. This design flaw allows an attacker or malicious peer device to exploit timing windows by injecting a premature connection response that matches the source Connection Identifier (CID) of the pending channel.
Upon receiving such a prematurely crafted connection response, the L2CAP layer incorrectly transitions the channel state directly to BT_CONFIG and subsequently marks it as connected, bypassing the necessary security verification steps. The subsequent failure in the security handshake does not trigger an appropriate teardown or rejection mechanism because the l2cap_security_cfm callback function assumes that if the channel is already in a connected state, no further action is required regarding connection termination. Consequently, this results in a persistent open logical link established without meeting the requisite security level defined by the Bluetooth specification and local policy settings. This effectively creates an unauthorized communication path where sensitive data could be exfiltrated or malicious commands executed over a channel that should have been rejected due to failed authentication or encryption requirements.
A secondary aspect of this vulnerability involves identifier collision during connection response matching. The protocol allows for connection responses with zero source CIDs, which are matched based on the Connection Identifier (CID) field within the packet header rather than the logical channel ID. In scenarios where multiple channels exist simultaneously, it is possible for one outgoing channel to hold a specific CID value while awaiting its own response, even if that request has not yet been transmitted or is still pending in the queue. The flawed lookup logic may incorrectly associate an incoming connection response intended for another context with this waiting channel due to identifier overlap. This misidentification leads to further state corruption and potential privilege escalation within the protocol stack, as the kernel applies configuration parameters meant for one logical link to a different active session, potentially exposing internal buffers or control structures to unintended manipulation by remote peers.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability undermines the fundamental security guarantees of Bluetooth Low Energy connections in Linux-based systems ranging from embedded IoT devices to desktop operating environments. An attacker positioned within radio range can exploit these race conditions and state machine errors to establish persistent, unauthenticated channels. This could lead to denial-of-service conditions by exhausting system resources through invalid channel allocations or facilitate more severe attacks such as man-in-the-middle interceptions if subsequent layers rely on the assumption that L2CAP connections are fully secured. The ability to bypass security checks at this layer compromises confidentiality and integrity across all higher-layer protocols dependent on these logical channels, including Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) services used for device configuration and data exchange in smart home devices, wearables, and industrial sensors.
Mitigation strategies primarily involve applying the upstream kernel patches that enforce strict validation of connection response origins against outstanding requests. System administrators should ensure their systems are updated to versions containing these fixes, particularly if they deploy Bluetooth-enabled infrastructure exposed to untrusted networks or public spaces. For environments where immediate patching is not feasible, disabling unnecessary Bluetooth services and restricting device pairing permissions can reduce the attack surface. Furthermore, network segmentation strategies that isolate IoT devices from critical corporate or personal networks provide an additional layer of defense against exploitation attempts leveraging this L2CAP state machine flaw.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-367, which describes Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race conditions, as the system checks security status at one point but uses a connection established before that check completed. It also relates to CWE-940, Improper Verification of Authentication Credentials, since the channel remains open despite failed authentication outcomes. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK mapping, this flaw facilitates Initial Access and potentially Persistence through unauthorized Bluetooth connections, allowing adversaries to establish footholds in systems relying on standard Linux kernel implementations without proper validation of protocol state transitions.