| Title | harnessrouter >= 0.9.0, < 0.31.13 Server-Side Request Forgery |
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| Description | POST /v1/cloud-upload/targets and POST /v1/cloud-upload/targets/test take a base_url from the request body and call {base_url}/v1/me from the server to learn which workspace a key belongs to; an upload to a stored destination then calls {base_url}/v1/uhp. Neither call checked the address. Anyone holding an API key could make the server request any host and port, including private, loopback and link-local (cloud metadata) addresses, and read back the status the target answered with and the workspace fields it returned. MCP server, database and git addresses already passed the server's internal-address check; this path never called it. |
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| Source | ⚠️ https://github.com/HarnessRouter/harnessrouter/security/advisories/GHSA-c5g7-c47h-f6c3 |
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| User | mikannse (UID 100854) |
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| Submission | 10/08/2026 04:07 (14 days ago) |
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| Moderation | 10/21/2026 11:01 (13 days later) |
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| Status | Accepted |
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| VulDB entry | 424709 [HarnessRouter up to 0.31.12 Targets Test Endpoint gateway/app.py base_url server-side request forgery] |
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| Points | 20 |
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