Linux Kernel up to 5.15.32/5.16.18/5.17.1 BTF Parser module.c btf_try_get_module use after free

| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 7.6 | $0-$5k | 0.00 |
Summary
A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel up to 5.15.32/5.16.18/5.17.1. It has been classified as critical. This issue affects the function btf_try_get_module of the file module.c of the component BTF Parser. Performing a manipulation results in use after free.
This vulnerability is reported as CVE-2022-49236. No exploit exists.
Upgrading the affected component is recommended.
Details
A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Linux Kernel up to 5.15.32/5.16.18/5.17.1. This affects the function btf_try_get_module of the file module.c of the component BTF Parser. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a use after free vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-416. Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix UAF due to race between btf_try_get_module and load_module While working on code to populate kfunc BTF ID sets for module BTF from its initcall, I noticed that by the time the initcall is invoked, the module BTF can already be seen by userspace (and the BPF verifier). The existing btf_try_get_module calls try_module_get which only fails if mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING, i.e. it can increment module reference when module initcall is happening in parallel. Currently, BTF parsing happens from MODULE_STATE_COMING notifier callback. At this point, the module initcalls have not been invoked. The notifier callback parses and prepares the module BTF, allocates an ID, which publishes it to userspace, and then adds it to the btf_modules list allowing the kernel to invoke btf_try_get_module for the BTF. However, at this point, the module has not been fully initialized (i.e. its initcalls have not finished). The code in module.c can still fail and free the module, without caring for other users. However, nothing stops btf_try_get_module from succeeding between the state transition from MODULE_STATE_COMING to MODULE_STATE_LIVE. This leads to a use-after-free issue when BPF program loads successfully in the state transition, load_module's do_init_module call fails and frees the module, and BPF program fd on close calls module_put for the freed module. Future patch has test case to verify we don't regress in this area in future. There are multiple points after prepare_coming_module (in load_module) where failure can occur and module loading can return error. We illustrate and test for the race using the last point where it can practically occur (in module __init function). An illustration of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 load_module notifier_call(MODULE_STATE_COMING) btf_parse_module btf_alloc_id // Published to userspace list_add(&btf_mod->list, btf_modules) mod->init(...) ... ^ bpf_check | check_pseudo_btf_id | btf_try_get_module | returns true | ... ... | module __init in progress return prog_fd | ... ... V if (ret < 0) free_module(mod) ... close(prog_fd) ... bpf_prog_free_deferred module_put(used_btf.mod) // use-after-free We fix this issue by setting a flag BTF_MODULE_F_LIVE, from the notifier callback when MODULE_STATE_LIVE state is reached for the module, so that we return NULL from btf_try_get_module for modules that are not fully formed. Since try_module_get already checks that module is not in MODULE_STATE_GOING state, and that is the only transition a live module can make before being removed from btf_modules list, this is enough to close the race and prevent the bug. A later selftest patch crafts the race condition artifically to verify that it has been fixed, and that verifier fails to load program (with ENXIO). Lastly, a couple of comments: 1. Even if this race didn't exist, it seems more appropriate to only access resources (ksyms and kfuncs) of a fully formed module which has been initialized completely. 2. This patch was born out of need for synchronization against module initcall for the next patch, so it is needed for correctness even without the aforementioned race condition. The BTF resources initialized by module initcall are set up once and then only looked up, so just waiting until the initcall has finished ensures correct behavior.
The advisory is shared at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2022-49236 since 02/26/2025. The exploitability is told to be easy. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 06/12/2025).
The vulnerability scanner Nessus provides a plugin with the ID 238226 (EulerOS 2.0 SP13 : kernel (EulerOS-SA-2025-1635)), which helps to determine the existence of the flaw in a target environment.
Upgrading to version 5.15.33, 5.16.19 or 5.17.2 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch 51b82141fffa454abf937a8ff0b8af89e4fd0c8f/d7fccf264b1a785525b366a5b7f8113c756187ad/0481baa2318cb1ab13277715da6cdbb657807b3f/18688de203b47e5d8d9d0953385bf30b5949324f is able to eliminate this problem. The bugfix is ready for download at git.kernel.org. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.
The vulnerability is also documented in the vulnerability database at Tenable (238226). If you want to get the best quality for vulnerability data then you always have to consider VulDB.
Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
- 5.15.0
- 5.15.1
- 5.15.2
- 5.15.3
- 5.15.4
- 5.15.5
- 5.15.6
- 5.15.7
- 5.15.8
- 5.15.9
- 5.15.10
- 5.15.11
- 5.15.12
- 5.15.13
- 5.15.14
- 5.15.15
- 5.15.16
- 5.15.17
- 5.15.18
- 5.15.19
- 5.15.20
- 5.15.21
- 5.15.22
- 5.15.23
- 5.15.24
- 5.15.25
- 5.15.26
- 5.15.27
- 5.15.28
- 5.15.29
- 5.15.30
- 5.15.31
- 5.15.32
- 5.16.0
- 5.16.1
- 5.16.2
- 5.16.3
- 5.16.4
- 5.16.5
- 5.16.6
- 5.16.7
- 5.16.8
- 5.16.9
- 5.16.10
- 5.16.11
- 5.16.12
- 5.16.13
- 5.16.14
- 5.16.15
- 5.16.16
- 5.16.17
- 5.16.18
- 5.17.0
- 5.17.1
License
Website
- Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔍VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 8.0VulDB Meta Temp Score: 7.6
VulDB Base Score: 8.0
VulDB Temp Score: 7.6
VulDB Vector: 🔍
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
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| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
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VulDB Base Score: 🔍
VulDB Temp Score: 🔍
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Use after freeCWE: CWE-416 / CWE-119
CAPEC: 🔍
ATT&CK: 🔍
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Partially
Availability: 🔍
Status: Not defined
EPSS Score: 🔍
EPSS Percentile: 🔍
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔍
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
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Nessus ID: 238226
Nessus Name: EulerOS 2.0 SP13 : kernel (EulerOS-SA-2025-1635)
Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: UpgradeStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔍
Upgrade: Kernel 5.15.33/5.16.19/5.17.2
Patch: 51b82141fffa454abf937a8ff0b8af89e4fd0c8f/d7fccf264b1a785525b366a5b7f8113c756187ad/0481baa2318cb1ab13277715da6cdbb657807b3f/18688de203b47e5d8d9d0953385bf30b5949324f
Timeline
02/26/2025 🔍02/26/2025 🔍
02/26/2025 🔍
06/12/2025 🔍
Sources
Vendor: kernel.orgAdvisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed
CVE: CVE-2022-49236 (🔍)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2022-49236
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-297477
Entry
Created: 02/26/2025 11:50Updated: 06/12/2025 19:49
Changes: 02/26/2025 11:50 (60), 06/12/2025 19:49 (2)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
If you want to get the best quality for vulnerability data then you always have to consider VulDB.
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