Linux Kernel up to 6.18.32/7.0.9 CPU0 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c vfs_rmdir ctx use after free

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability has been found in Linux Kernel up to 6.18.32/7.0.9 and classified as critical. This issue affects the function vfs_rmdir of the file kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c of the component CPU0. The manipulation of the argument ctx leads to use after free. This vulnerability is referenced as CVE-2026-52991. No exploit is available. The affected component should be upgraded.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel up to 6.18.32/7.0.9. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects the function vfs_rmdir of the file kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c of the component CPU0. The manipulation of the argument ctx with an unknown input leads to a use after free vulnerability. Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-416. Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. Impacted is confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1]. Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== vfs_rmdir() kernfs_iop_rmdir() cgroup_rmdir() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_destroy_locked() cgroup_addrm_files() cgroup_rm_file() kernfs_remove_by_name() kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() vfs_write() __kernfs_remove() new_sync_write() kernfs_drain() kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file() pressure_write() cgroup_file_release() ctx = of->priv; kfree(ctx); of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_get(cgrp) cgroup_kn_unlock() if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered. Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write(). And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired. In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition: CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0 =========================== ============================= kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_get_active_of(of) pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure) cgroup_tryget(cgrp) kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) ... blocks on cgroup_mutex cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false) kernfs_show(false) kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_release(of) kfree(ctx) of->priv = NULL cgroup_kn_unlock() ... acquires cgroup_mutex ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this. Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 Call Trace: pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:43 ---truncated---

It is possible to read the advisory at git.kernel.org. The identification of this vulnerability is CVE-2026-52991 since 06/09/2026. The exploitation is known to be easy. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit. The pricing for an exploit might be around USD $5k-$25k at the moment (estimation calculated on 06/24/2026).

Upgrading to version 6.18.33 or 7.0.10 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch 03dc070fa0fc3cb4068693f468ccd5f8a7e58282/d4352c0709bfd38c752fccbde7fd72a82ac78f23/a5b98009f16d8a5fb4a8ff9a193f5735515c38fa is able to eliminate this problem. The bugfix is ready for download at git.kernel.org. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.

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Productinfo

Type

• Operating System

Vendor

• Linux

Name

• Kernel

Version

• 6.18.0
• 6.18.1
• 6.18.2
• 6.18.3
• 6.18.4
• 6.18.5
• 6.18.6
• 6.18.7
• 6.18.8
• 6.18.9
• 6.18.10
• 6.18.11
• 6.18.12
• 6.18.13
• 6.18.14
• 6.18.15
• 6.18.16
• 6.18.17
• 6.18.18
• 6.18.19
• 6.18.20
• 6.18.21
• 6.18.22
• 6.18.23
• 6.18.24
• 6.18.25
• 6.18.26
• 6.18.27
• 6.18.28
• 6.18.29
• 6.18.30
• 6.18.31
• 6.18.32
• 7.0.0
• 7.0.1
• 7.0.2
• 7.0.3
• 7.0.4
• 7.0.5
• 7.0.6
• 7.0.7
• 7.0.8
• 7.0.9

License

• open-source

Website

• Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/

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