mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 mcp__getComponentLink get-component-link.ts z.string url server-side request forgery
| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 5.7 | $0-$5k | 2.72 |
Summary
A vulnerability was found in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0. It has been rated as critical. The affected element is the function z.string of the file src/tools/get-component-link.ts of the component mcp__getComponentLink. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery.
This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-15750. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Furthermore, there is an exploit available.
The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Details
A vulnerability was found in mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp up to 0.2.0 and classified as critical. This issue affects the function z.string of the file src/tools/get-component-link.ts of the component mcp__getComponentLink. The manipulation of the argument url with an unknown input leads to a server-side request forgery vulnerability. Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-918. The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination. Impacted is confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The advisory is shared at github.com. The identification of this vulnerability is CVE-2026-15750. The exploitation is known to be easy. The attack may be initiated remotely. No form of authentication is needed for a successful exploitation. It demands that the victim is doing some kind of user interaction. Technical details as well as a public exploit are known.
The exploit is available at github.com. It is declared as proof-of-concept. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
There is no information about possible countermeasures known. It may be suggested to replace the affected object with an alternative product.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
Website
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 6.3VulDB Meta Temp Score: 5.7
VulDB Base Score: 6.3
VulDB Temp Score: 5.7
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
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| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Server-side request forgeryCWE: CWE-918
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes
Availability: 🔒
Access: Public
Status: Proof-of-Concept
Download: 🔒
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Today | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: no mitigation knownStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Timeline
07/14/2026 Advisory disclosed07/14/2026 VulDB entry created
07/14/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Product: github.comAdvisory: 89
Status: Not defined
CVE: CVE-2026-15750 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-15750
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-378329
scip Labs: https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20161013
Entry
Created: 07/14/2026 17:44Changes: 07/14/2026 17:44 (60)
Complete: 🔍
Submitter: Mcfly_Zhang
Cache ID: 216::103
Submit
Accepted
- Submit #856633: mastergo-design mastergo-magic-mcp 0.2.0 Server-Side Request Forgery (by Mcfly_Zhang)
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
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