ongres scram up to 3.2 SCRAM Client getChannelBindingData downgrade
| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | $0-$5k | 2.23 |
Summary
A vulnerability was found in ongres scram up to 3.2 and classified as problematic. Affected by this issue is the function getChannelBindingData of the component SCRAM Client. The manipulation results in downgrade.
This vulnerability was named CVE-2026-53712. The attack may be performed from remote. There is no available exploit.
Details
A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in ongres scram up to 3.2. Affected is the function getChannelBindingData of the component SCRAM Client. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a downgrade vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-757. A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality. CVE summarizes:
SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.
The advisory is shared for download at github.com. This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-53712 since 06/10/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploitation doesn't require any form of authentication. There are known technical details, but no exploit is available. The MITRE ATT&CK project declares the attack technique as T1562.010.
Upgrading to version 3.3 eliminates this vulnerability.
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
Product
Vendor
Name
Version
Website
- Product: https://github.com/ongres/scram/
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 5.3VulDB Meta Temp Score: 5.1
VulDB Base Score: 5.3
VulDB Temp Score: 5.1
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
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| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
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| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
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VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: DowngradeCWE: CWE-757
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes
Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
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Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: no mitigation knownStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Upgrade: scram 3.3
Timeline
06/10/2026 CVE reserved07/17/2026 Advisory disclosed
07/17/2026 VulDB entry created
07/17/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Product: github.comAdvisory: github.com
Status: Confirmed
CVE: CVE-2026-53712 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-53712
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-379908
Entry
Created: 07/17/2026 20:51Changes: 07/17/2026 20:51 (54)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
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