Linux Kernel up to 7.1.2 Tipc net/tipc/crypto.c tipc_aead_decrypt_done stats/net use after free

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability has been found in Linux Kernel up to 7.1.2 and classified as very critical. The impacted element is the function tipc_aead_decrypt_done of the file net/tipc/crypto.c of the component Tipc. Performing a manipulation of the argument stats/net results in use after free. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-63801. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. No exploit is available.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in Linux Kernel up to 7.1.2. This affects the function tipc_aead_decrypt_done of the file net/tipc/crypto.c of the component Tipc. The manipulation of the argument stats/net with an unknown input leads to a use after free vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-416. Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it: tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory. Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51 Workqueue: events_unbound Call Trace: tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 169: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502) tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72) ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137) setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446) copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579) create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132) __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Freed by task 8: kfree (mm/slub.c:6566) tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119) cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard. Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done(). Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

The advisory is shared at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-63801 since 07/19/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. No form of authentication is needed for exploitation. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $5k-$25k at the moment (estimation calculated on 07/19/2026).

Upgrading to version 5.10.260, 5.15.211, 6.1.177, 6.6.144, 6.12.95, 6.18.38, 7.1.3 or 7.2-rc1 eliminates this vulnerability.

The vulnerability is also documented in the vulnerability database at EUVD (EUVD-2026-45467). Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

Productinfo

Type

• Operating System

Vendor

• Linux

Name

• Kernel

Version

• 5.10.259
• 5.15.210
• 6.1.176
• 6.6.143
• 6.12.0
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• 6.18.0
• 6.18.1
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• 6.18.3
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• 6.18.33
• 6.18.34
• 6.18.35
• 6.18.36
• 6.18.37
• 7.1.0
• 7.1.1
• 7.1.2

License

• open-source

Website

• Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/

CPE 2.3info

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CPE 2.2info

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Entryinfo

Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

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