Linux Kernel up to 6.12.92/6.18.34/7.0.11 FunctionFS ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete use after free

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, has been found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.92/6.18.34/7.0.11. Affected by this vulnerability is the function ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete of the component FunctionFS. Performing a manipulation results in use after free. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-63894. Attacking locally is a requirement. No exploit is available.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.92/6.18.34/7.0.11. This affects the function ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete of the component FunctionFS. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a use after free vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-416. Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_fs: serialize DMABUF cancel against request completion ffs_epfile_dmabuf_io_complete() calls usb_ep_free_request() on the completed request but leaves priv->req, the back-pointer that ffs_dmabuf_transfer() set on submission, pointing at the freed memory. A later FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl or ffs_epfile_release() on the close path still sees priv->req non-NULL under ffs->eps_lock: if (priv->ep && priv->req) usb_ep_dequeue(priv->ep, priv->req); so usb_ep_dequeue() is called on a freed usb_request. On dummy_hcd the dequeue path only walks a live queue and pointer-compares, so the freed pointer reads without faulting and KASAN requires an explicit check at the FunctionFS call site to surface the use-after-free. On SG-capable in-tree UDCs the dequeue path dereferences the supplied request immediately: * chipidea's ep_dequeue() does container_of(req, struct ci_hw_req, req) and reads hwreq->req.status before acquiring its own lock. * cdnsp's cdnsp_gadget_ep_dequeue() reads request->status first. The narrower option of clearing priv->req via cmpxchg() in the completion does not close the race: the completion runs without eps_lock, so a cancel path holding eps_lock can still observe priv->req non-NULL, race a concurrent completion that clears and frees, and pass the freed pointer to usb_ep_dequeue(). A slightly longer fix that moves the free into the cleanup work is needed. Same class of lifetime race as the recent usbip-vudc timer fix [1]. Take eps_lock in the sole place that mutates priv->req from the callback direction by moving usb_ep_free_request() out of the completion into ffs_dmabuf_cleanup(), the existing work handler scheduled by ffs_dmabuf_signal_done() on ffs->io_completion_wq. Clear priv->req there under eps_lock before freeing, and only clear if priv->req still names our request (a subsequent ffs_dmabuf_transfer() on the same attachment may have queued a new one). This keeps the existing dummy_hcd sync-dequeue invariant: the completion callback is still invoked by the UDC without eps_lock held (dummy_hcd drops its own lock before calling the callback), and the callback now takes no f_fs lock at all. Serialization against the cancel path happens in cleanup, which runs from the workqueue with no f_fs lock held on entry. The priv ref count protects the containing ffs_dmabuf_priv: ffs_dmabuf_transfer() takes a ref via ffs_dmabuf_get(), cleanup drops it via ffs_dmabuf_put(), so priv stays live for the cleanup even after the cancel path's list_del + ffs_dmabuf_put. The ffs_dmabuf_transfer() error path no longer frees usb_req inline: fence->req and fence->ep are set before usb_ep_queue(), so ffs_dmabuf_cleanup() (scheduled by the error-path ffs_dmabuf_signal_done()) owns the free regardless of whether the queue succeeded. Reproduced under KASAN on both detach and close paths against dummy_hcd with an observability hook (kasan_check_byte(priv->req) immediately before usb_ep_dequeue) at the two FunctionFS cancel sites to surface the stale-pointer access; the hook is not part of this patch. The KASAN allocator / free stacks in the captured splats identify the same request: alloc in dummy_alloc_request, free in dummy_timer, fault reached from ffs_epfile_release (close) and from the FUNCTIONFS_DMABUF_DETACH ioctl (detach). With the patch applied, both paths are silent under the same hook. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace or from a USB host on the cable. FunctionFS mounts default to GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, but the filesystem supports uid=, gid=, and fmode= delegation to a non-root gadget daemon, so on real deployments the attacker may be a less-privileged service rather than root.

The advisory is shared at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-63894 since 07/19/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. An attack has to be approached locally. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 07/19/2026).

Upgrading to version 6.12.93, 6.18.35 or 7.0.12 eliminates this vulnerability.

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Productinfo

Type

• Operating System

Vendor

• Linux

Name

• Kernel

Version

• 6.12.0
• 6.12.1
• 6.12.2
• 6.12.3
• 6.12.4
• 6.12.5
• 6.12.6
• 6.12.7
• 6.12.8
• 6.12.9
• 6.12.10
• 6.12.11
• 6.12.12
• 6.12.13
• 6.12.14
• 6.12.15
• 6.12.16
• 6.12.17
• 6.12.18
• 6.12.19
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• 6.12.34
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• 6.12.81
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• 6.12.84
• 6.12.85
• 6.12.86
• 6.12.87
• 6.12.88
• 6.12.89
• 6.12.90
• 6.12.91
• 6.12.92
• 6.18.0
• 6.18.1
• 6.18.2
• 6.18.3
• 6.18.4
• 6.18.5
• 6.18.6
• 6.18.7
• 6.18.8
• 6.18.9
• 6.18.10
• 6.18.11
• 6.18.12
• 6.18.13
• 6.18.14
• 6.18.15
• 6.18.16
• 6.18.17
• 6.18.18
• 6.18.19
• 6.18.20
• 6.18.21
• 6.18.22
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• 6.18.24
• 6.18.25
• 6.18.26
• 6.18.27
• 6.18.28
• 6.18.29
• 6.18.30
• 6.18.31
• 6.18.32
• 6.18.33
• 6.18.34
• 7.0.0
• 7.0.1
• 7.0.2
• 7.0.3
• 7.0.4
• 7.0.5
• 7.0.6
• 7.0.7
• 7.0.8
• 7.0.9
• 7.0.10
• 7.0.11

License

• open-source

Website

• Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/

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