louislam Dockge up to 1.5.0 Stack Validation docker-socket-handler.ts Stack.getStack stackName path traversal

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability marked as very critical has been reported in louislam Dockge up to 1.5.0. This issue affects the function Stack.getStack of the file backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts of the component Stack Validation. This manipulation of the argument stackName causes path traversal. The identification of this vulnerability is CVE-2026-73040. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. There is no exploit available.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability classified as very critical was found in louislam Dockge up to 1.5.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function Stack.getStack of the file backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts of the component Stack Validation. The manipulation of the argument stackName with an unknown input leads to a path traversal vulnerability. The CWE definition for the vulnerability is CWE-22. The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory. As an impact it is known to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.

It is possible to read the advisory at github.com. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-73040 since 08/10/2026. The exploitation appears to be easy. The attack can be launched remotely. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit. The pricing for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 08/20/2026). The attack technique deployed by this issue is T1006 according to MITRE ATT&CK.

There is no information about possible countermeasures known. It may be suggested to replace the affected object with an alternative product.

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Productinfo

Vendor

• louislam

Name

• Dockge

Version

• 1.0
• 1.1
• 1.2
• 1.3
• 1.4
• 1.5.0

Website

• Product: https://github.com/louislam/dockge/

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