Linux Kernel up to 7.2.3 ALSA FCP fcp_ioctl_init resp information disclosure

| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | $0-$5k | 0.00+ |
Summary
A vulnerability identified as problematic has been detected in Linux Kernel up to 7.2.3. The affected element is the function fcp_ioctl_init of the component ALSA FCP. Performing a manipulation of the argument resp results in information disclosure.
This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-80970. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. No exploit is available.
You should upgrade the affected component.
Details
A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in Linux Kernel up to 7.2.3. This affects the function fcp_ioctl_init of the component ALSA FCP. The manipulation of the argument resp with an unknown input leads to a information disclosure vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-200. The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality. The summary by CVE is:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: FCP: do not copy out an uninitialised init response fcp_ioctl_init() allocates its response buffer with kmalloc() and copies the whole buffer back to userspace: buf_size = init.step0_resp_size + init.step2_resp_size; void *resp __free(kfree) = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); ... if (copy_to_user(arg->resp, resp, buf_size)) return -EFAULT; Nothing clears the buffer, and the only writer of its leading step0_resp_size bytes is the step-0 control transfer: err = snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), FCP_USB_REQ_STEP0, USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN, 0, private->bInterfaceNumber, step0_resp, private->step0_resp_size); if (err < 0) return err; usb_fill_control_urb() does not set URB_SHORT_NOT_OK, so a short or zero-length data stage completes with status 0 and snd_usb_ctl_msg() returns a small actual_length. The only check is err < 0, so a short transfer is accepted as success. snd_usb_ctl_msg() copies the full size back unconditionally: buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL); ... memcpy(data, buf, size); Bytes the device never wrote are therefore restored into resp unchanged and copied to userspace. step0_resp_size and step2_resp_size are each validated only to 1..255, so the caller also picks the slab cache, from kmalloc-8 up to kmalloc-512. On 7.2.0-rc5 (arm64), device answering step 0 with a zero-length data stage, s0 = s2 = 255: # init_on_alloc off, no spray step0 window [0,255): nonzero=94/255 000: 00 80 60 06 00 00 ff ff 18 00 00 00 57 01 ea 01 010: 08 78 22 13 00 00 ff ff a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff # same kernel, kmalloc-512 pre-seeded with an 8-byte tag step0 window [0,255): nonzero=219/255 tagbytes=232 # identical run, init_on_alloc=1 step0 window [0,255): nonzero=0/255 tagbytes=0 # all three runs step2 window [255,510): device words matched=62/62 a8 c4 5f 80 00 80 ff ff is the little-endian kernel text address ffff8000805fc4a8. The step-2 window is unaffected, so the disclosure is exactly the step-0 region. Zero the buffer, and require the step-0 transfer to deliver the full step0_resp_size bytes so a short data stage is reported as an error. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <[email protected]>
The advisory is shared at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-80970 since 08/26/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 09/11/2026). MITRE ATT&CK project uses the attack technique T1592 for this issue.
Upgrading to version 7.2.4 or 7.3-rc1 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch 29ab2df278ab4f1d238cd9c1c393ee00db175cba/4335e387786479889e6db691fe06d345e52ea536 is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
License
Website
- Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 4.3VulDB Meta Temp Score: 4.1
VulDB Base Score: 4.3
VulDB Temp Score: 4.1
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Information disclosureCWE: CWE-200 / CWE-284 / CWE-266
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes
Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Today | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: UpgradeStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Upgrade: Kernel 7.2.4/7.3-rc1
Patch: 29ab2df278ab4f1d238cd9c1c393ee00db175cba/4335e387786479889e6db691fe06d345e52ea536
Timeline
08/26/2026 CVE reserved09/11/2026 Advisory disclosed
09/11/2026 VulDB entry created
09/11/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Vendor: kernel.orgAdvisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed
CVE: CVE-2026-80970 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-80970
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-402705
Entry
Created: 09/11/2026 23:50Changes: 09/11/2026 23:50 (60)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.
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