Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini up to 1.11.0 App Installation local_common_venv.py install_package improper authentication

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini up to 1.11.0. Affected is the function install_package of the file src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py of the component App Installation. This manipulation causes improper authentication. This vulnerability appears as CVE-2026-96455. The attack may be initiated remotely. There is no available exploit.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability was found in Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini up to 1.11.0. It has been declared as critical. Affected by this vulnerability is the function install_package of the file src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py of the component App Installation. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a improper authentication vulnerability. The CWE definition for the vulnerability is CWE-287. When an actor claims to have a given identity, the product does not prove or insufficiently proves that the claim is correct. As an impact it is known to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.

The advisory is shared at github.com. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-96455 since 09/23/2026. The exploitation appears to be easy. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploitation doesn't need any form of authentication. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 09/23/2026).

There is no information about possible countermeasures known. It may be suggested to replace the affected object with an alternative product.

Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

Productinfo

Type

• Survey Software

Vendor

• Pollen Robotics

Name

• Reachy Mini

Version

• 1.0
• 1.1
• 1.2
• 1.3
• 1.4
• 1.5
• 1.6
• 1.7
• 1.8
• 1.9
• 1.10
• 1.11.0

CPE 2.3info

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CPE 2.2info

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Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

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