Linux Kernel up to 6.12.110/6.18.52/7.2.6/7.3-rc1 RDS Connection Shutdown net/rds rds_conn_shutdown race condition

| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 6.2 | $0-$5k | 0.17+ |
Summary
A vulnerability described as critical has been identified in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.110/6.18.52/7.2.6/7.3-rc1. Affected by this vulnerability is the function rds_conn_shutdown of the file net/rds of the component RDS Connection Shutdown. Executing a manipulation can lead to race condition.
This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-98068. The attack can be launched remotely. No exploit exists.
Upgrading the affected component is recommended.
Details
A vulnerability classified as critical was found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.110/6.18.52/7.2.6/7.3-rc1. This vulnerability affects the function rds_conn_shutdown of the file net/rds of the component RDS Connection Shutdown. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a race condition vulnerability. The CWE definition for the vulnerability is CWE-362. The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. As an impact it is known to affect availability. CVE summarizes:
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail the shutdown into a noisy error path. But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN is a no-op. For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released. It is not harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first. rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper. Its path claim in rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN -> RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR. The accept then installs the freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued teardown - which sampled tc->t_sock before this socket existed - is still running. rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should reap the socket it just installed. If the in-flight shutdown's final transition consumes that drop's RDS_CONN_ERROR, the queued pass finds the path in RDS_CONN_DOWN and does nothing. The installed socket is never torn down: it sits established with its callbacks armed and its rds_tcp_connection on rds_tcp_tc_list, the peer sees a connection that nothing ever reads, and the path is wedged in RDS_CONN_DOWN until some later event drops it again. Reproduced with widened race windows as an ever-growing receive queue on a socket owned by a path stuck in RDS_CONN_DOWN, with the peer's send path wedged behind it. Make the final transition only DISCONNECTING -> DOWN. If it fails because the path is in RDS_CONN_ERROR, a drop raced the teardown: cancel the reconnect timer and clear RDS_RECONNECT_PENDING - the one piece of the skipped tail that must not be left behind - and return, letting the pass the drop queued finish the job: it tears down whatever attached to the path in the meantime, completes the transition to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and re-arms the reconnect from its own tail. The timer quiesce in that branch matters because the racing drop does not always queue that pass: rds_conn_path_drop() returns without queueing when a destroy is pending - exactly the situation during a netns teardown or module unload, when a FIN on the dying socket is processed while rds_conn_path_destroy() flushes cp_down_w. If the flushed pass is the one that takes this return, no later pass exists, and rds_conn_path_destroy() would find cp_conn_w still armed (WARN_ON) and then free a path whose reconnect timer can still fire. With the cancel in the branch, every exit of a shutdown pass leaves the timer quiesced no matter which pass completes the transition. The FIN case keeps making progress, one pass later and still without noisy logging. Any other state keeps today's rds_conn_path_error() handling; no current cp_state writer can leave a DISCONNECTING path in anything but RDS_CONN_ERROR (every other writer is a cmpxchg from a non-DISCONNECTING state), so that branch is defensive. On kernels without the preceding patches the same hazard exists with the sample-based quiesce; the fix applies there equally.
The advisory is shared for download at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability was named CVE-2026-98068 since 09/25/2026. The exploitation appears to be easy. The attack can be initiated remotely. There are known technical details, but no exploit is available. The current price for an exploit might be approx. USD $0-$5k (estimation calculated on 09/25/2026).
Upgrading to version 6.12.111, 6.18.53, 7.2.7 or 7.3-rc2 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch bd1cb197a07111ca8d4f4c21411c56a3c85a9797/4cb9b6d3d31a2dbaa5469981c2c4c03e9acc7aca/2941561395066be856a53626d4ca973dd9c982b2/260c6308fe2e19ad519389d44d582e292aecc3af is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
- 6.12.110
- 6.18.0
- 6.18.1
- 6.18.2
- 6.18.3
- 6.18.4
- 6.18.5
- 6.18.6
- 6.18.7
- 6.18.8
- 6.18.9
- 6.18.10
- 6.18.11
- 6.18.12
- 6.18.13
- 6.18.14
- 6.18.15
- 6.18.16
- 6.18.17
- 6.18.18
- 6.18.19
- 6.18.20
- 6.18.21
- 6.18.22
- 6.18.23
- 6.18.24
- 6.18.25
- 6.18.26
- 6.18.27
- 6.18.28
- 6.18.29
- 6.18.30
- 6.18.31
- 6.18.32
- 6.18.33
- 6.18.34
- 6.18.35
- 6.18.36
- 6.18.37
- 6.18.38
- 6.18.39
- 6.18.40
- 6.18.41
- 6.18.42
- 6.18.43
- 6.18.44
- 6.18.45
- 6.18.46
- 6.18.47
- 6.18.48
- 6.18.49
- 6.18.50
- 6.18.51
- 6.18.52
- 7.2.0
- 7.2.1
- 7.2.2
- 7.2.3
- 7.2.4
- 7.2.5
- 7.2.6
- 7.3-rc1
License
Website
- Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 6.5VulDB Meta Temp Score: 6.2
VulDB Base Score: 6.5
VulDB Temp Score: 6.2
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv2
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| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
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VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Race conditionCWE: CWE-362
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes
Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
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Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: UpgradeStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Upgrade: Kernel 6.12.111/6.18.53/7.2.7/7.3-rc2
Patch: bd1cb197a07111ca8d4f4c21411c56a3c85a9797/4cb9b6d3d31a2dbaa5469981c2c4c03e9acc7aca/2941561395066be856a53626d4ca973dd9c982b2/260c6308fe2e19ad519389d44d582e292aecc3af
Timeline
09/25/2026 Advisory disclosed09/25/2026 CVE reserved
09/25/2026 VulDB entry created
09/25/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Vendor: kernel.orgAdvisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed
CVE: CVE-2026-98068 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-98068
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-410212
Entry
Created: 09/25/2026 15:43Changes: 09/25/2026 15:43 (60)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
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