ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2 Broadcast Sink bap_broadcast_sink.c base_subgroup_meta_cb out-of-bounds

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability labeled as very critical has been found in ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2. The affected element is the function base_subgroup_meta_cb of the file subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_sink.c of the component Broadcast Sink. The manipulation results in out-of-bounds. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-19570. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. No exploit is available. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2. Affected is the function base_subgroup_meta_cb of the file subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_sink.c of the component Broadcast Sink. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a out-of-bounds vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-125. The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CVE summarizes:

The LE Audio Broadcast Sink in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_sink.c copies subgroup metadata from a received Basic Audio Announcement (BASE) into the static Broadcast Audio Scan Service parameter structure mod_src_param without any bounds check. In base_subgroup_meta_cb() the destination element was selected as mod_src_param.subgroups[mod_src_param.num_subgroups] with no test against ARRAY_SIZE(mod_src_param.subgroups) (sized by CONFIG_BT_BAP_BASS_MAX_SUBGROUPS, default 1), and the metadata was copied with memcpy() using the raw on-air length returned by bt_bap_base_get_subgroup_codec_meta() into a metadata array sized by CONFIG_BT_AUDIO_CODEC_CFG_MAX_METADATA_SIZE (default 4). The BASE validator bt_bap_base_get_base_from_ad() only checks structural consistency and permits up to ~24 subgroups and metadata LTVs of ~240 octets. The defect is reached from the periodic advertising receive callback: pa_recv() → bt_data_parse() → pa_decode_base() → update_recv_state_base() → bt_bap_base_foreach_subgroup() → base_subgroup_meta_cb(). Every broadcast sink registers a scan-delegator receive state at creation (bt_bap_broadcast_sink_create() calls broadcast_sink_add_src()), and CONFIG_BT_BAP_BROADCAST_SINK depends on CONFIG_BT_BAP_SCAN_DELEGATOR, so the path is active in every broadcast-sink build once the device is periodic-advertising-synced. An attacker in radio range who operates a broadcast source the device syncs to — or who impersonates the advertiser address and SID of one already in use, periodic advertising data being unauthenticated — can change the BASE at will; each new BASE is re-parsed. A crafted BASE therefore writes attacker-chosen bytes past the end of a fixed static object in .bss: up to roughly 236 bytes for an oversized metadata LTV, plus whole struct bt_bap_bass_subgroup records for each subgroup beyond CONFIG_BT_BAP_BASS_MAX_SUBGROUPS. This is memory corruption of adjacent Bluetooth-audio state reachable with no pairing, bonding or GATT connection, with a potential for remote code execution in the Bluetooth RX thread; in addition, the unvalidated metadata_len is forwarded to bt_bap_scan_delegator_mod_src(), which neither clamps it nor rejects it, leading to a further copy into the receive state and to out-of-bounds memory being disclosed in the BASS receive-state notification sent to a connected Broadcast Assistant. The fix rejects a BASE carrying more subgroups than the receive state can hold (discarding the update entirely) and omits metadata that does not fit rather than copying it, and additionally honours the previously-ignored error return of the subgroup decode pass.

The advisory is shared for download at github.com. This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-19570 since 08/11/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploitation doesn't require any form of authentication. There are known technical details, but no exploit is available. The current price for an exploit might be approx. USD $0-$5k (estimation calculated on 10/09/2026).

Applying the patch 5738f61f4128bb38508bab57342b1f7bf218d127 is able to eliminate this problem.

Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.

Productinfo

Type

• Project Management Software

Vendor

• ZephyrProject

Name

• Zephyr

Version

• 4.4.0
• 4.4.1
• 4.4.2

CPE 2.3info

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CPE 2.2info

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Entryinfo

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