hexpm hex 0.11.2/2.5.1 HTTP Request Hex.HTTP.request resource consumption

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability identified as problematic has been detected in hexpm hex 0.11.2/2.5.1. This affects the function Hex.HTTP.request of the component HTTP Request Handler. Performing a manipulation results in resource consumption. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-96618. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. No exploit is available. You should upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability was found in hexpm hex 0.11.2/2.5.1. It has been classified as problematic. This affects the function Hex.HTTP.request of the component HTTP Request Handler. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a resource consumption vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-400. The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. This is going to have an impact on availability. The summary by CVE is:

Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in hexpm hex allows an untrusted package mirror to exhaust the memory or disk space of the machine running mix deps.get, mix deps.update, mix hex.package fetch or mix hex.docs fetch. Hex treats a mirror configured with HEX_MIRROR_URL, HEX_MIRROR or mirror_url as untrusted: it doesn't send credentials to it, and it checks registry signatures and package checksums that the mirror can't forge. Several response paths consume memory or disk in proportion to what the mirror sends before any of those checks run. Hex.HTTP.request/5 reads the whole response body into memory and decompresses it with :zlib.gunzip/1 whenever the response's Content-Encoding contains gzip, with no limit on the compressed or decompressed size. Hex doesn't ask for compressed responses, so the server decides whether this step runs. It applies to registry, package, docs and API responses. Package tarballs have no download size limit. Hex 2.5.1 holds the whole tarball in memory and writes it to the cache, and the development branch streams it to a temporary file; the 16 MiB tarball limit is checked only when the file is unpacked. The tarball is then unpacked, into deps/<app> in 2.5.1 and into a staging directory on the development branch, before its checksums are compared with the registry. mix hex.docs fetch, and mix hex.docs offline when docs are missing, write the docs tarball to disk and extract it with :mix_hex_erl_tar.extract/2 without the 16 MiB compressed and 128 MiB decompressed limits that mix_hex_tarball:unpack_docs/3 applies. The signed registry doesn't cover docs tarballs, so nothing checks them. Registry responses are also decompressed before their signature is checked, in hex_core code that Hex vendors; that part is tracked in https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/security/advisories/GHSA-7c4r-cgf9-9jmq. This issue affects hex: from 0.11.2 before 2.5.2.

The advisory is shared at github.com. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-96618 since 10/10/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. No form of authentication is needed for exploitation. It demands that the victim is doing some kind of user interaction. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. MITRE ATT&CK project uses the attack technique T1499 for this issue.

Upgrading to version 2.5.2 eliminates this vulnerability.

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Productinfo

Vendor

• hexpm

Name

• hex

Version

• 0.11.2
• 2.5.1

Website

• Product: https://github.com/hexpm/hex/

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Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

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