Linux Kernel up to 6.12.112/6.18.56/7.2.10 namei step_into locking

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3.2$0-$5k1.56

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.112/6.18.56/7.2.10. Affected by this issue is the function step_into of the component namei. This manipulation causes locking. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-98980. The attack is restricted to local execution. No exploit exists. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability has been found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.112/6.18.56/7.2.10 and classified as problematic. Affected by this vulnerability is the function step_into of the component namei. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a locking vulnerability. The CWE definition for the vulnerability is CWE-667. The product does not properly acquire or release a lock on a resource, leading to unexpected resource state changes and behaviors. As an impact it is known to affect confidentiality. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namei: don't reveal overmounted entries in refwalk In rcuwalk the dentry is validated before it is accepted. step_into() step_into() rechecks d_seq and __follow_mount_rcu() rechecks mount_lock. An entry that gets unlinked in between causes the lookup to retry and miss. A refwalk doesn't do this. lookup_fast() takes a reference on the hashed dentry and simply accepts it. So an unlink that happens after the reference was taken isn't seen by refwalk. That's fine for a simple file. We just happened to open it before it was unlinked, no problem. For a mountpoint and specifically a locked mountpoint it very much isn't. The unlink detaches all mounts and then removes the name. Any refwalk that hasn't traversed the mounts yet simply reveals the underlying entry. It's a very narrow window but it can be hit: reads of a covered file in 60 s, 3 walkers, ~15000 unlinks no widening 27 that step + 200 us 3741 See the appended patch for a more reliable reproducer. So check the entry after step_into(). unlink(), rmdir() and rename() mark the dentry with dont_mount() before they detach the mounts and remove the dentry. So a dentry that is marked with DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT and is unhashed by the time its mounts were looked at is a name that was unlinked under the refwalk. DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT is read after the mounts were looked up and it is set before they are detached by detach_mounts(). A refwalk that missed the mounts will see DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT. Plain d_unlinked() is fine. A rename takes the dentry off its hash chain but ___d_drop() leaves d_hash.pprev set. So only __d_drop() and a rename over the dentry unhash it. The only move that flips IS_ROOT splices in a disconnected alias. That doesn't have DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT set. Add the to step_into_slowpath(). ".." and LOOKUP_DOWN may legitimately land on an unhashed directory. A refwalk that crossed onto a mount has path.mnt different from nd->path.mnt. A dentry that a filesystem dropped on its own (d_invalidate(), d_drop()) doesn't have the flag set and is treated as before. // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of * its mount, against walkers that open it through that copy. * * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1, * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT. * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED). * * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers] */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdatomic.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/openat2.h> #ifndef __NR_open_tree #define __NR_open_tree 428 #endif #ifndef __NR_move_mount #define __NR_move_mount 429 #endif #ifndef __NR_openat2 #define __NR_openat2 437 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 #endif #define WORK "/tmp/uc" #define ADIR WORK "/A" static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3; static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting; static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER; static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 while there is none */ static atomic_long n_unlink, n_walk, n_mark, n_enoent, n_othe ---truncated---

It is possible to read the advisory at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-98980 since 09/25/2026. The exploitation appears to be easy. Attacking locally is a requirement. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit.

Upgrading to version 6.12.113, 6.18.57 or 7.2.11 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0/5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0/b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007/8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994 is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.

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Productinfo

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CPE 2.3info

CPE 2.2info

CVSSv4info

VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv3info

VulDB Meta Base Score: 3.3
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 3.2

VulDB Base Score: 3.3
VulDB Temp Score: 3.2
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv2info

AVACAuCIA
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VectorComplexityAuthenticationConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
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VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

Exploitinginfo

Class: Locking
CWE: CWE-667
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒

Physical: Partially
Local: Yes
Remote: No

Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒

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Threat Intelligenceinfo

Interest: 🔍
Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍

Countermeasuresinfo

Recommended: Upgrade
Status: 🔍

0-Day Time: 🔒

Upgrade: Kernel 6.12.113/6.18.57/7.2.11
Patch: e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0/5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0/b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007/8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994

Timelineinfo

09/25/2026 CVE reserved
10/23/2026 +28 days Advisory disclosed
10/23/2026 +0 days VulDB entry created
10/23/2026 +0 days VulDB entry last update

Sourcesinfo

Vendor: kernel.org

Advisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed

CVE: CVE-2026-98980 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-98980
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-425767

Entryinfo

Created: 10/23/2026 15:00
Changes: 10/23/2026 15:00 (59)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103

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