Linux Kernel up to 7.2.10 Mount Namespace Propagation attach_recursive_mnt privileges management

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability was found in Linux Kernel up to 7.2.10 and classified as problematic. The affected element is the function attach_recursive_mnt of the component Mount Namespace Propagation. The manipulation results in privileges management. This vulnerability is reported as CVE-2026-98976. The attack requires a local approach. No exploit exists. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability classified as problematic has been found in Linux Kernel up to 7.2.10. Affected is the function attach_recursive_mnt of the component Mount Namespace Propagation. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a privileges management vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-269. The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CVE summarizes:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint allowing the top mount to be unmounted. Consider two mount namespaces: (H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d (Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d. Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked. Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it: Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */ H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /* Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */ Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */ So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is unmounted again.

The advisory is shared for download at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-98976 since 09/25/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. The attack needs to be approached locally. There are known technical details, but no exploit is available. The current price for an exploit might be approx. USD $0-$5k (estimation calculated on 10/23/2026). The MITRE ATT&CK project declares the attack technique as T1068.

Upgrading to version 7.2.11 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch f1f0c24ca701d7d3061c7f69f7450f1734c11745/d74d66aa708ccf2bc0b1e265a83fed0f2308d5c4 is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.

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Productinfo

Type

• Operating System

Vendor

• Linux

Name

• Kernel

Version

• 7.2.0
• 7.2.1
• 7.2.2
• 7.2.3
• 7.2.4
• 7.2.5
• 7.2.6
• 7.2.7
• 7.2.8
• 7.2.9
• 7.2.10

License

• open-source

Website

• Vendor: https://www.kernel.org/

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