Linux Kernel up to 6.18.56/7.2.10 Mount Propagation fs/namespace.c propagate_mount_busy locking

CVSS Meta Temp Score
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8.7$0-$5k0.83-

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability identified as very critical has been detected in Linux Kernel up to 6.18.56/7.2.10. This issue affects the function propagate_mount_busy of the file fs/namespace.c of the component Mount Propagation. Performing a manipulation results in locking. This vulnerability is reported as CVE-2026-98996. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. No exploit exists. You should upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in Linux Kernel up to 6.18.56/7.2.10. This affects the function propagate_mount_busy of the file fs/namespace.c of the component Mount Propagation. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a locking vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-667. The product does not properly acquire or release a lock on a resource, leading to unexpected resource state changes and behaviors. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts The propagate_mount_busy() helper exists to decide whether a synchronous can suceed. It does that by looking at the copies of the victims in the mounts its parent propagates to. One of those functions from propagation hell. It skips a copy that has child mounts except for the case of a single child mount covering the copy's root. That algorithm used to be exact. It isn't anymore. Originally only childless copies were unmounted during propagation. And 1064f874abc0 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") ended up adding covered mounts to both sides in one go. Along came 99b19d16471e ("mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order") and that started to unmount more than before: [1]: A copy of a mount is unmounted when each of its children is either its overmount or a copy of the victim itself. In the former case the overmount gets reparented. In the latter case the copy of the victim will end up being unmounted. So propagate_umount() ended up being rewritten without adjusting propagate_mount_busy(). And currently propagate_mount_busy() doesn't look at copies of the victim that have two or more children nor a single child that is not the overmount. So any such copy in [1] is not checked for references. The result is that a synchronous unmount succeeds, pulling out a mount that is still in use. A container can run into this with its own mounts. The host shares a tree with the container and the host has a mount in that tree: mount -t tmpfs none /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mount -t tmpfs none /mnt/a The container's /mnt is a slave copy of the host mount. The container now takes a detached copy of the tree and mounts that copy beneath its propagated copy of /mnt/a and keeps the file descriptor to the tree open: unshare -m --propagation unchanged mount --make-rslave / fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE) move_mount(fd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt/a", MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 777 775 ... /mnt/a ... master:646 776 777 ... /mnt/a ... master:647 778 777 ... /mnt/a/a ... master:647 The now attached tree (777) is now mounted beneath the container's copy of /mnt/a. That's also where the host mount sits (as seen from the host mount namespace). So the propagated copy (776) of the host's mount is on top of its root and the copy of that (778) is inside it. Now the host runs: umount /mnt/a and it succeeds. The moved tree tree and the copy inside of it are gone from the container. Now only the propagated copy is left and it got reparented to where it was before: grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 776 775 ... /mnt/a ... But the file descriptor still refers to the moved tree. So a synchronous umount detached a mount that is still in use. Teach propagate_mount_busy() the same checks that propagate_umount() does. It now checks for a single victim mount without children for which it can assume that MNT_LOCKED is cleared on every copy like propagate_umount() does. The copies form chains. IOW, when a copy itself receives propagation from the victim's parent then the mount at the same mountpoint inside that copy is a copy as well. Whether a mount receives propagation from the victim's can simply be checked by walking its masters. Walk each chain once from its top so we are sure that nested copies stay linear. Check every reference once of every copy that gets unmounted.

It is possible to read the advisory at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-98996 since 09/25/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Additional levels of successful authentication are required for exploitation. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit. The pricing for an exploit might be around USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 10/23/2026).

Upgrading to version 6.18.57 or 7.2.11 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch bf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908/a210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f/6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859 is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.

Be aware that VulDB is the high quality source for vulnerability data.

Productinfo

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CPE 2.3info

CPE 2.2info

CVSSv4info

VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv3info

VulDB Meta Base Score: 9.1
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 8.7

VulDB Base Score: 9.1
VulDB Temp Score: 8.7
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv2info

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VectorComplexityAuthenticationConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
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VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

Exploitinginfo

Class: Locking
CWE: CWE-667
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒

Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes

Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒

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Threat Intelligenceinfo

Interest: 🔍
Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍

Countermeasuresinfo

Recommended: Upgrade
Status: 🔍

0-Day Time: 🔒

Upgrade: Kernel 6.18.57/7.2.11
Patch: bf2c8dec26fb792876b5e9bde7030c45d8be3908/a210ac218c307513d43e98a08f23c2dfbeeebc2f/6857e209015f95be7a8f19a9cd5dac345b9b9859

Timelineinfo

09/25/2026 CVE reserved
10/23/2026 +28 days Advisory disclosed
10/23/2026 +0 days VulDB entry created
10/23/2026 +0 days VulDB entry last update

Sourcesinfo

Vendor: kernel.org

Advisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed

CVE: CVE-2026-98996 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-98996
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-425847

Entryinfo

Created: 10/23/2026 15:40
Changes: 10/23/2026 15:40 (60)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103

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