ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2 GPIO gpio_handlers.c z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure pin out-of-bounds write
| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1 | $0-$5k | 1.75 |
Summary
A vulnerability was found in ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2. It has been declared as very critical. Impacted is the function z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure of the file drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c of the component GPIO. The manipulation of the argument pin results in out-of-bounds write.
This vulnerability is known as CVE-2026-82961. Attacking locally is a requirement. No exploit is available.
It is best practice to apply a patch to resolve this issue.
Details
A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in ZephyrProject Zephyr up to 4.4.2. Affected is the function z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure of the file drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c of the component GPIO. The manipulation of the argument pin with an unknown input leads to a out-of-bounds write vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-787. The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. CVE summarizes:
The GPIO syscall handlers in drivers/gpio/gpio_handlers.c did not validate the pin argument supplied by a user-mode caller. z_vrfy_gpio_pin_configure(), z_vrfy_gpio_pin_get_config() and z_vrfy_gpio_pin_interrupt_configure() verified only the device object (K_SYSCALL_DRIVER_GPIO() / K_SYSCALL_OBJ()) and then passed the caller-supplied gpio_pin_t straight through to z_impl_gpio_pin_*() and on to the driver. The only pin check in include/zephyr/drivers/gpio.h was __ASSERT(gpio_port_pin_is_supported(cfg->port_pin_mask, pin), ...), which compiles to nothing unless CONFIG_ASSERT is enabled, so in a production build no check existed at all. GPIO drivers use pin as a shift count and as an array index on the documented assumption that it is a pin the controller supports. On STM32, for example, gpio_stm32_pin_interrupt_configure() turns pin into an EXTI line and stm32_gpio_intc_set_irq_callback() writes data->cb[line_num].cb and data->cb[line_num].data into a NUM_EXTI_LINES-entry array (default 16) in drivers/interrupt_controller/intc_gpio_stm32.c, guarded only by a compiled-out __ASSERT_NO_MSG(); the same function then reads exti_irq_table[line_num] and calls irq_enable() on the result. Other controllers index fixed-size per-pin configuration tables the same way — drivers/gpio/gpio_ite_it8xxx2_v2.c reads an MMIO base pointer out of wuc_base[8] with the caller's pin and performs a read-modify-write through it. The issue is reachable only in builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y (the file is compiled under that symbol), by a user-mode thread that has been granted access to a GPIO device object. Such a grant is intended to authorize control of that port's pins; the missing validation instead lets the thread drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of a function pointer and an associated void * past a kernel .bss array, and out-of-bounds reads that feed irq_enable() and MMIO accesses — an escape from the user-mode sandbox that can lead to kernel memory corruption, arbitrary code execution, or a crash. The fix validates pin against the controller's gpio_driver_config.port_pin_mask with gpio_port_pin_is_supported() in every pin-taking z_vrfy_ handler and returns -EINVAL otherwise, complemented by an unconditional pin >= GPIO_MAX_PINS_PER_PORT range check added to the shared z_impl_gpio_pin_*() inlines.
The advisory is available at github.com. This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-82961 since 08/31/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. Local access is required to approach this attack. Technical details are known, but there is no available exploit. The structure of the vulnerability defines a possible price range of USD $0-$5k at the moment (estimation calculated on 10/28/2026).
Applying the patch 020e83e06b35e98a4a3c2354f67e5eee3f163363 is able to eliminate this problem.
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Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 8.3VulDB Meta Temp Score: 8.1
VulDB Base Score: 8.8
VulDB Temp Score: 8.4
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CNA Base Score: 7.8
CNA Vector (zephyr): 🔒
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Out-of-bounds writeCWE: CWE-787 / CWE-119
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: Partially
Local: Yes
Remote: No
Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Today | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: PatchStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Patch: 020e83e06b35e98a4a3c2354f67e5eee3f163363
Timeline
08/31/2026 CVE reserved10/28/2026 Advisory disclosed
10/28/2026 VulDB entry created
10/28/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Advisory: github.comStatus: Confirmed
CVE: CVE-2026-82961 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-82961
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-428070
Entry
Created: 10/28/2026 18:20Changes: 10/28/2026 18:20 (68)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
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