Linux Kernel up to 6.12.117/6.18.63/7.3.4/7.4-rc1 CAN isotp_release use after free

CVSS Meta Temp Score
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CTI Interest Score
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9.5$5k-$25k0.20+

Summaryinfo

A vulnerability marked as very critical has been reported in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.117/6.18.63/7.3.4/7.4-rc1. This vulnerability affects the function isotp_release of the component CAN. Performing a manipulation results in use after free. This vulnerability is identified as CVE-2026-99672. The attack can be initiated remotely. There is not any exploit available. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.

Detailsinfo

A vulnerability classified as very critical has been found in Linux Kernel up to 6.12.117/6.18.63/7.3.4/7.4-rc1. This affects the function isotp_release of the component CAN. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a use after free vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-416. The product reuses or references memory after it has been freed. At some point afterward, the memory may be allocated again and saved in another pointer, while the original pointer references a location somewhere within the new allocation. Any operations using the original pointer are no longer valid because the memory "belongs" to the code that operates on the new pointer. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock The receive lists of a CAN device are located in the device's can_ml_priv and travel with the device when it is moved to another network namespace. But they are protected by the per-netns rcvlists_lock. So can_rx_unregister() needs dev_net(dev) to pick the right lock and silently returns when the passed namespace does not match dev_net(dev) anymore. isotp_release() and bcm_release() leave their notifier list before they take any lock that serializes against the netdev notifier, which runs under RTNL. When the bound device is moved to another namespace in this window, the notifier skips the socket and the release path has to remove the filters itself. isotp_release() passes the socket's namespace, which does not match dev_net(dev) anymore. bcm_rx_unreg() passes dev_net(dev), which can_rx_unregister() reads again for its check, so a namespace change between both reads makes the check fail as well. In both cases can_rx_unregister() silently returns. As can_rx_register() stores rcv->sk without a reference, the remaining receivers point to the freed socket (isotp) or the freed op (bcm): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in isotp_rcv+0x1570/0x24d0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888118130552 by task isotp_ns_uaf/578 can_rcv_filter+0x4af/0x8c0 can_receive+0x28d/0x3c0 can_rcv+0x2a9/0x310 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x21a/0x260 process_backlog+0x210/0x760 Besides this, the lists of a device are protected by the rcvlists_lock of the namespace that is passed in. Callers which pass dev_net(dev) read it at different times, so the same lists may be modified under the locks of different namespaces while the device is moved. Taking RTNL in these release paths is no option: raw_bind(), raw_setsockopt() and raw_release() already hold RTNL while adding and removing up to CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX filters per socket, which unprivileged users can trigger repeatedly and which makes RTNL a global bottleneck. Instead fix the root cause and add a spinlock to struct can_dev_rcv_lists, which protects the receive lists of a CAN device or the 'any' CAN device lists of a namespace. It is initialized in can_set_ml_priv(), which is used by all CAN network devices. With this, can_rx_unregister() finds the subscription independently of the current namespace of the device. The protocols keep the device valid with their tracked references. The per-netns rcvlists_lock only protects the receive list statistics anymore, and CAN_RAW, CAN_BCM and CAN_ISOTP pass the namespace that has been used for can_rx_register(). So isotp_release() and bcm_release() now remove their filters correctly without RTNL, and raw_release(), raw_setsockopt(), raw_bind() and isotp_bind() do not need RTNL anymore and add and remove their filters under lock_sock(). To serialize bind() with NETDEV_UNREGISTER, bind() publishes the device inside the RCU section of its lookup, and raw_notify() and isotp_notify() recheck the bound device under lock_sock(). As RTNL does not keep NETDEV_DOWN out of bind() anymore, bind() checks IFF_UP after publishing the bound device, with a barrier pair against raw_notify() and isotp_notify(), so a down transition during bind() is still reported with ENETDOWN.

The advisory is shared at git.kernel.org. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2026-99672 since 09/25/2026. The exploitability is told to be easy. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Technical details are known, but no exploit is available. The price for an exploit might be around USD $5k-$25k at the moment (estimation calculated on 11/20/2026).

Upgrading to version 6.12.118, 6.18.64, 7.3.5 or 7.4-rc2 eliminates this vulnerability. Applying the patch 59d91f555ada337458c48316987b8ef46487f885/4b625dde57c0a40a933bf017ff93a64a7306aa43/228e795ec650c33ebbce8ba81ce983c84d64d889/0f3ad9ab40e3dad06d5c0693806e07935ceedbc3 is able to eliminate this problem. The best possible mitigation is suggested to be upgrading to the latest version.

Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

Productinfo

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CPE 2.3info

CPE 2.2info

CVSSv4info

VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv3info

VulDB Meta Base Score: 9.9
VulDB Meta Temp Score: 9.5

VulDB Base Score: 9.9
VulDB Temp Score: 9.5
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

CVSSv2info

AVACAuCIA
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💳💳💳💳💳💳
💳💳💳💳💳💳
VectorComplexityAuthenticationConfidentialityIntegrityAvailability
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VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍

Exploitinginfo

Class: Use after free
CWE: CWE-416 / CWE-119
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒

Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes

Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒

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Threat Intelligenceinfo

Interest: 🔍
Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍

Countermeasuresinfo

Recommended: Upgrade
Status: 🔍

0-Day Time: 🔒

Upgrade: Kernel 6.12.118/6.18.64/7.3.5/7.4-rc2
Patch: 59d91f555ada337458c48316987b8ef46487f885/4b625dde57c0a40a933bf017ff93a64a7306aa43/228e795ec650c33ebbce8ba81ce983c84d64d889/0f3ad9ab40e3dad06d5c0693806e07935ceedbc3

Timelineinfo

09/25/2026 CVE reserved
11/20/2026 +56 days Advisory disclosed
11/20/2026 +0 days VulDB entry created
11/20/2026 +0 days VulDB entry last update

Sourcesinfo

Vendor: kernel.org

Advisory: git.kernel.org
Status: Confirmed

CNA: Linux
CVE: CVE-2026-99672 (🔒)

GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-99672
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-441081

Entryinfo

Created: 11/20/2026 07:50
Changes: 11/20/2026 07:50 (59)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103

Several companies clearly confirm that VulDB is the primary source for best vulnerability data.

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