Zephyr Project up to 4.3.1/4.4.x Network Interface Address Management subsys/net/ip/net_if.c net_if_ipv4_addr_rm/net_if_ipv6_addr_rm denial of service
| CVSS Meta Temp Score | Current Exploit Price (≈) | CTI Interest Score |
|---|---|---|
| 6.3 | $0-$5k | 0.00+ |
Summary
A vulnerability was found in Zephyr Project Zephyr up to 4.3.1/4.4.x. It has been rated as critical. Affected is the function net_if_ipv4_addr_rm/net_if_ipv6_addr_rm of the file subsys/net/ip/net_if.c of the component Network Interface Address Management. The manipulation leads to denial of service.
This vulnerability is traded as CVE-2026-95825. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. There is no exploit available.
Upgrading the affected component is advised.
Details
A vulnerability was found in Zephyr Project Zephyr up to 4.3.1/4.4.x. It has been rated as critical. This issue affects the function net_if_ipv4_addr_rm/net_if_ipv6_addr_rm of the file subsys/net/ip/net_if.c of the component Network Interface Address Management. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a denial of service vulnerability. Using CWE to declare the problem leads to CWE-404. The product does not release or incorrectly releases a resource before it is made available for re-use. Impacted is availability. The summary by CVE is:
net_if_ipv4_addr_rm() and net_if_ipv6_addr_rm() in subsys/net/ip/net_if.c unconditionally called net_if_addr_unref() on the target address. When an earlier removal could not complete because another subsystem still held a reference (the TCP stack takes one on the local address of every connection, in tcp_conn_new() and on connect()), the address is left in place with is_added cleared and is_used still set. A second removal of such an address decremented the reference count again, consuming a reference owned by that other holder. When it was the last one, the address slot was released, its NET_EVENT_IPV*_ADDR_DEL event fired, and the slot became reusable while the holder still believed it owned a reference. Every address lookup helper matches on is_used and not on is_added, so a half-removed address stays visible to the rest of the stack and repeat removals are readily reachable from remote input. Under IPv6 SLAAC, an on-link node that sends a Router Advertisement with a short valid lifetime causes the address to expire into the deferred state; a refreshing Router Advertisement is handled by net_if_ipv6_addr_update_lifetime(), which re-arms the lifetime timer without restoring the reference, so the next expiry performs the second, reference-stealing removal. With CONFIG_NET_IPV4_ACD and DHCPv4, repeated spoofed ARP conflicts for the device's lease drive dhcpv4_acd_event_handler() into calling net_if_ipv4_addr_rm() more than once on the same address. Where CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled, the net_if_ipv4_addr_rm_by_index() and net_if_ipv6_addr_rm_by_index() system calls let an unprivileged user-mode thread trigger the same kernel-side release deterministically. The impact is loss of a configured IP address while connections are still using it, and a corrupted reference count that propagates: the slot can be handed to a newly added address, and when the stale holder later tears down, net_if_addr_unref() resolves the address by value and drops the new incarnation's only reference, removing a live address a second time. The affected objects are static array slots and the counter is never decremented below zero, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure; the consequence is denial of service against the device's network connectivity, repeatable at the attacker's pace. The fix resolves the address before touching the reference count and returns false without calling net_if_addr_unref() when the address is already marked as removed, so the public removal API can no longer consume a reference it does not own.
It is possible to read the advisory at github.com. The identification of this vulnerability is CVE-2026-95825 since 09/22/2026. The exploitation is known to be easy. The attack may be initiated remotely. No form of authentication is needed for a successful exploitation. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit. The attack technique deployed by this issue is T1499 according to MITRE ATT&CK.
Upgrading to version 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 eliminates this vulnerability.
Statistical analysis made it clear that VulDB provides the best quality for vulnerability data.
Product
Type
Vendor
Name
Version
CPE 2.3
CPE 2.2
CVSSv4
VulDB Vector: 🔒VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CVSSv3
VulDB Meta Base Score: 6.4VulDB Meta Temp Score: 6.3
VulDB Base Score: 7.5
VulDB Temp Score: 7.2
VulDB Vector: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
CNA Base Score: 5.3
CNA Vector (zephyr): 🔒
CVSSv2
| AV | AC | Au | C | I | A |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 | 💳 |
| Vector | Complexity | Authentication | Confidentiality | Integrity | Availability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
| Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
VulDB Base Score: 🔒
VulDB Temp Score: 🔒
VulDB Reliability: 🔍
Exploiting
Class: Denial of serviceCWE: CWE-404
CAPEC: 🔒
ATT&CK: 🔒
Physical: No
Local: No
Remote: Yes
Availability: 🔒
Status: Not defined
Price Prediction: 🔍
Current Price Estimation: 🔒
| 0-Day | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Today | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock | Unlock |
Threat Intelligence
Interest: 🔍Active Actors: 🔍
Active APT Groups: 🔍
Countermeasures
Recommended: UpgradeStatus: 🔍
0-Day Time: 🔒
Upgrade: Zephyr 4.3.2/4.5.0
Timeline
09/22/2026 CVE reserved11/20/2026 Advisory disclosed
11/20/2026 VulDB entry created
11/20/2026 VulDB entry last update
Sources
Advisory: github.comStatus: Confirmed
CNA: zephyr
CVE: CVE-2026-95825 (🔒)
GCVE (CVE): GCVE-0-2026-95825
GCVE (VulDB): GCVE-100-441539
Entry
Created: 11/20/2026 19:11Changes: 11/20/2026 19:11 (67)
Complete: 🔍
Cache ID: 216::103
Statistical analysis made it clear that VulDB provides the best quality for vulnerability data.
No comments yet. Languages: en.
Please log in to comment.