CVE-2000-1142 in ManTrap
Summary
by MITRE
Recourse ManTrap 1.6 generates an error when an attacker cd s to /proc/self/cwd and executes the pwd command, which allows attackers to determine that they are in a honeypot system.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/28/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2000-1142 affects Recourse ManTrap version 1.6, a honeypot system designed to detect and monitor malicious network activity. This particular flaw represents a significant security weakness in the honeypot's ability to maintain operational integrity and deception capabilities. The vulnerability stems from how the system handles directory traversal operations within the /proc filesystem, specifically when processing the pwd command from within the /proc/self/cwd path. This behavior exposes critical system information that can be leveraged by attackers to identify the honeypot environment. The issue directly relates to CWE-200, which addresses the exposure of sensitive information to an unauthorized actor, and demonstrates how improper system behavior can inadvertently reveal the nature of a security system.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability occurs when an attacker navigates to the /proc/self/cwd directory and executes the pwd command. Under normal circumstances, this operation should not produce any unusual behavior, but in Recourse ManTrap 1.6, the system generates an error response that inadvertently reveals information about its underlying architecture. This error response contains metadata or system indicators that distinguish it from a genuine system, allowing attackers to recognize they are interacting with a honeypot rather than an actual target system. The flaw operates at the application level and demonstrates a lack of proper error handling and system abstraction that would normally mask such implementation details from external observers.
From an operational standpoint, this vulnerability severely undermines the effectiveness of the honeypot deployment by breaking the deception model that is fundamental to its purpose. When attackers can easily determine they are in a honeypot environment, they can modify their attack strategies accordingly, potentially avoiding detection or focusing on different targets entirely. This undermines the primary security objective of honeypots, which is to lure attackers into revealing their techniques and intentions while remaining undetected. The vulnerability also impacts the system's ability to collect meaningful intelligence data, as adversaries who recognize the honeypot environment may choose to abandon their attempts or limit their activities to avoid detection by the security team.
The mitigation approach for this vulnerability involves implementing proper error handling and system abstraction within the honeypot software to prevent information leakage. Security practitioners should ensure that all system responses, particularly those related to directory traversal and file operations, are normalized to prevent distinctive error patterns that could reveal the system's nature. This aligns with ATT&CK technique T1497 which addresses adversary tactics for system and network discovery. Organizations should also consider updating to newer versions of honeypot software that have addressed such information disclosure vulnerabilities, or implementing additional layers of abstraction to mask the underlying system characteristics. Regular security assessments of honeypot deployments should include checks for similar information leakage vulnerabilities that could compromise the deception environment.