CVE-2026-54418 in Leantime
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
Leantime through 3.6.2 exposes the JSON-RPC methods leantime.rpc.TwoFA.TwoFA.getSetupData, saveSecret, verifyAndEnable, and disable2FA, which act on a caller-supplied userId parameter with no ownership check, session pinning, or permission-attribute gate (unlike other RPC-exposed methods in the same dispatcher). Any authenticated user can invoke getSetupData with an arbitrary userId to read that user's live TOTP secret, or disable2FA to strip another account's two-factor authentication entirely, fully defeating account-level 2FA protection. This is related to CVE-2026-15509, which covers a similar missing-authorization pattern in the JSON-RPC editUser/addUser role-assignment path in the same application; the TwoFA service methods addressed here are a distinct, independently fixable set of RPC endpoints.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical authorization flaw in the Leantime application affecting versions through 3.6.2 where JSON-RPC methods for two-factor authentication management lack proper access controls. The exposed methods leantime.rpc.TwoFA.TwoFA.getSetupData, saveSecret, verifyAndEnable, and disable2FA accept a userId parameter that can be manipulated by any authenticated user without verification of ownership or proper session validation. This design pattern creates a privilege escalation vector where malicious actors can bypass normal access controls to manipulate authentication settings for other users. The vulnerability specifically affects the core security mechanism of two-factor authentication, allowing attackers to obtain live TOTP secrets from arbitrary user accounts or completely disable 2FA protection for target accounts.
The technical implementation flaw stems from the absence of proper authorization checks within the JSON-RPC dispatcher for these specific methods. Unlike other RPC endpoints in the same service which properly validate permissions and session context, the TwoFA methods operate without any ownership verification or session pinning mechanisms. This creates a direct pathway for authenticated users to invoke administrative functions against arbitrary user accounts through the JSON-RPC interface. The vulnerability can be classified as a bypass of authorization controls under CWE-285 and represents an improper access control scenario that allows privilege escalation through API method manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and affects the fundamental security posture of the application's authentication system. An attacker who gains access to any authenticated user account can leverage this weakness to compromise other users' accounts by either obtaining their TOTP secrets or disabling their 2FA protection entirely. This effectively neutralizes the additional security layer that 2FA provides, making it possible for attackers to escalate privileges and gain unauthorized access to sensitive data and system resources. The vulnerability directly impacts the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of user accounts within the application's ecosystem.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper authorization checks for all RPC methods that operate on user-specific data. The solution requires adding ownership verification logic that ensures callers can only access or modify their own user data, along with session pinning mechanisms to validate that the authenticated session corresponds to the target user account. Additionally, the application should enforce role-based access controls where specific permissions are required to perform administrative functions like disabling 2FA for other users. The fix should align with security best practices such as principle of least privilege and defense in depth, ensuring that all RPC endpoints properly validate both authentication and authorization contexts before executing sensitive operations.
This vulnerability demonstrates a pattern commonly seen in web applications where API endpoints lack proper access control validation, creating opportunities for attackers to exploit authentication bypasses. The issue is particularly concerning because it affects core security functions rather than general application features, making it a high-priority remediation. Security teams should implement comprehensive testing procedures to identify similar authorization gaps in other RPC methods and ensure all user-facing administrative functions properly validate caller credentials against target account ownership.
The vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566.002 for credential access through API abuse, where attackers exploit improperly protected APIs to gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or system functionality. It also maps to ATT&CK tactic TA0006 privilege escalation through the ability to modify authentication settings for other users. Organizations should conduct thorough security assessments of their application's RPC interfaces and implement proper input validation, access control enforcement, and session management to prevent similar issues from occurring in other components of their software infrastructure.