CVE-2026-71213 in Typemill
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
Typemill's login endpoint (POST /tm/login, ControllerWebAuth::login()) performs no rate-limiting, failed-attempt counting, or account lockout when captcha is disabled, which is the default configuration. An unauthenticated attacker can send unlimited password-guessing requests against any account, including administrators, with no throttling. The only attempt-counting/lockout logic present in the same file protects an optional secondary email-authcode step and does not apply to the primary password check.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
The vulnerability described represents a critical authentication weakness in Typemill's web application that exposes all user accounts to brute force attacks without any protective measures. This flaw exists within the ControllerWebAuth::login() method where the login endpoint processes POST requests to /tm/login. The absence of rate-limiting mechanisms means that attackers can continuously submit password guessing attempts against any valid account, including administrative accounts, without encountering any blocking or throttling behavior.
The technical implementation fails to incorporate fundamental security controls that should be present in any production authentication system. When captcha protection is disabled, which represents the default configuration setting, the application provides no mechanism to detect or prevent automated attack patterns from occurring. This creates a scenario where an attacker can theoretically attempt unlimited password combinations against accounts without any defensive measures.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it enables unauthorized access to any user account through brute force methods alone. Administrative accounts become particularly vulnerable since attackers can systematically guess passwords without detection or blocking. The lack of proper account lockout mechanisms means that even if an attacker manages to identify valid credentials through repeated attempts, the system provides no protection against further unauthorized access attempts.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts and follows patterns identified in ATT&CK technique T1110 - Brute Force. The implementation only includes account lockout logic for an optional secondary email authentication step, which is separate from the primary password validation process. This design flaw means that the existing security controls are applied inconsistently across different authentication stages within the same system.
Organizations should implement comprehensive rate-limiting at the application level to restrict the number of login attempts per IP address or user account. The solution requires integrating time-based throttling mechanisms and account lockout features that activate after a predetermined number of failed attempts. Additionally, implementing CAPTCHA verification for login attempts, especially when automated traffic is detected, would provide an additional layer of protection against automated attacks.
Security architects should consider implementing multi-factor authentication as a defense-in-depth strategy to mitigate the risk of compromised passwords. The system should also incorporate logging and monitoring capabilities that can detect unusual login patterns and trigger alerts for security operations teams to investigate potential attack activities. These measures align with industry standards such as NIST SP 800-63B which emphasizes the importance of authentication strength and protection against automated attacks in modern web applications.
The default configuration issue represents a particularly dangerous aspect of this vulnerability since many administrators may never change the default settings, leaving their systems continuously exposed to brute force attacks. This design flaw demonstrates the importance of secure-by-default configurations and proper security hardening practices that should be implemented during application development rather than relying on administrative intervention for protection.
Organizations using Typemill should immediately implement rate-limiting controls at both network and application layers to prevent unlimited login attempts. The system configuration should be updated to enable CAPTCHA verification by default, and administrators should be required to explicitly disable this feature only after understanding the security implications. Regular security assessments should also verify that authentication mechanisms are properly configured and functioning as intended.
The vulnerability highlights the critical need for proper security testing during development phases, particularly focusing on authentication controls and their implementation in real-world scenarios. This weakness serves as a reminder that even basic authentication systems require robust protection mechanisms to defend against automated attacks that can be executed with minimal technical expertise or resources.