CVE-2026-71245 in Mautic
Summary
by MITRE • 08/05/2026
Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2026
This vulnerability exists within Mautic's LeadBundle controller where the getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction function processes user input without adequate sanitization for SQL identifier contexts. The flaw stems from InputHelper::clean() method which only performs HTML-entity-encoding on quotes and angle brackets but fails to restrict other potentially dangerous characters including spaces, parentheses, and SQL injection vectors. When the field parameter is passed to LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue(), it gets directly concatenated into the SQL query as a column identifier without proper validation against a whitelist of legitimate column names. This creates an SQL injection opportunity where attackers can manipulate the field parameter to inject malicious SQL code that gets executed as part of the query construction.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it allows authenticated users to perform unauthorized database operations through the field parameter. Since the action only requires a valid session rather than specific permission checks, any authenticated user within the system can exploit this flaw. The vulnerability operates at the database abstraction layer where the column name gets directly concatenated into the SQL query string without proper identifier validation, making it distinct from typical parameter injection scenarios. This type of vulnerability maps to CWE-89 SQL Injection and specifically represents a case where identifier injection occurs rather than value injection, as the attacker targets the structural components of the SQL query rather than its data values.
The attack surface extends beyond simple data retrieval as this vulnerability can enable attackers to extract sensitive information, modify database schema, or even escalate privileges within the application's database context. The lack of input validation at the identifier level means that attackers could potentially manipulate the database structure through crafted field names containing UNION statements, comments, or other SQL constructs. From an ATT&CK perspective, this represents a privilege escalation and defense evasion technique where authenticated users can leverage this vulnerability to gain deeper access to the underlying data infrastructure. The exploitation requires minimal prerequisites beyond having a valid session, making it particularly dangerous in environments where session management is not properly enforced across all application functions.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing strict input validation for SQL identifiers by maintaining a whitelist of allowed column names and rejecting any input that does not match predefined patterns. The InputHelper::clean() function should be enhanced to specifically block SQL-relevant characters in identifier contexts, or better yet, the application should avoid direct concatenation of user input into SQL queries entirely. The recommended approach involves validating field parameters against a known list of legitimate column names before allowing their use in query construction, implementing proper escaping mechanisms for identifiers, and considering the use of Doctrine's built-in identifier quoting capabilities where available. Additionally, access controls should be implemented to ensure that all API endpoints requiring database interaction have appropriate permission checks rather than relying solely on session validity for protection.