CVE-2002-2212 in UXP-V
Summary
by MITRE
The DNS resolver in unspecified versions of Fujitsu UXP/V, when resolving recursive DNS queries for arbitrary hosts, allows remote attackers to conduct DNS cache poisoning via a birthday attack that uses a large number of open queries for the same resource record (RR) combined with spoofed responses, which increases the possibility of successfully spoofing a response in a way that is more efficient than brute force methods.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/12/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2002-2212 affects the DNS resolver implementation within Fujitsu UXP/V systems, representing a significant security weakness in network infrastructure software. This flaw specifically manifests during recursive DNS query resolution processes where the system handles requests for arbitrary hosts. The vulnerability exploits a fundamental weakness in the DNS cache management mechanism that governs how the system processes and validates DNS responses. The issue stems from the resolver's inability to properly handle a large volume of concurrent queries for the same resource record, creating predictable patterns that adversaries can exploit through sophisticated attack methodologies. This weakness fundamentally undermines the integrity of DNS resolution services and creates opportunities for malicious actors to compromise network communications and data integrity.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability relies on a birthday attack approach that leverages statistical probability rather than traditional brute force methods. Attackers can systematically submit numerous open queries for identical resource records while simultaneously injecting spoofed DNS responses into the network traffic. This technique exploits the mathematical principle that with sufficient query volume, the probability of generating a collision in the DNS cache increases dramatically. The system's DNS resolver fails to implement adequate collision detection mechanisms or query rate limiting that would normally prevent such attacks from succeeding. The birthday attack methodology aligns with common techniques described in cybersecurity literature and represents a well-established approach for DNS cache poisoning that has been documented in various security research publications. This vulnerability specifically targets the resolver's hash function or cache mapping algorithm that determines how DNS responses are stored and retrieved.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple service disruption to encompass serious security implications for network infrastructure. Successful exploitation allows attackers to redirect network traffic to malicious destinations by poisoning DNS caches with false information, potentially enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, data interception, or complete network compromise. The vulnerability affects the fundamental trust model of DNS resolution, undermining the confidence that network services and applications place in DNS responses. Organizations relying on Fujitsu UXP/V systems face potential exposure to sophisticated attacks that could compromise sensitive data, disrupt critical services, and provide attackers with persistent access to network resources. The attack efficiency of this method makes it particularly dangerous as it requires fewer resources than traditional brute force approaches while achieving the same malicious objectives. This vulnerability creates opportunities for attackers to establish persistent footholds within networks and conduct long-term surveillance or data exfiltration activities.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2002-2212 should focus on implementing robust DNS security measures including proper query rate limiting, enhanced cache validation mechanisms, and improved collision detection protocols. Organizations should deploy DNSSEC (DNS Security Extensions) to provide cryptographic authentication of DNS responses, which would prevent many cache poisoning attacks from succeeding. Network administrators should configure systems to implement randomized transaction IDs and implement proper source port randomization to make spoofing attacks more difficult. The implementation of DNS query logging and monitoring systems can help detect anomalous query patterns that may indicate attempted cache poisoning. Security patches or system updates from Fujitsu should be applied immediately to address the underlying implementation flaws in the DNS resolver. Additionally, implementing network segmentation and access controls can limit the potential damage from successful exploitation, while regular security audits and penetration testing can help identify similar vulnerabilities in other network infrastructure components. This vulnerability demonstrates the importance of following established security frameworks such as those outlined in the CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) catalog and ATT&CK (Attack Tree) methodologies for understanding and mitigating DNS-related security threats.