CVE-2002-2213 in DNS One
Summary
by MITRE
The DNS resolver in unspecified versions of Infoblox DNS One, when resolving recursive DNS queries for arbitrary hosts, allows remote attackers to conduct DNS cache poisoning via a birthday attack that uses a large number of open queries for the same resource record (RR) combined with spoofed responses, which increases the possibility of successfully spoofing a response in a way that is more efficient than brute force methods.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/12/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2002-2213 represents a significant security flaw in the DNS resolution mechanisms of Infoblox DNS One software, specifically affecting versions prior to the patch release. This issue fundamentally compromises the integrity of DNS resolution processes by exploiting weaknesses in the cache management system that handles recursive DNS queries. The vulnerability operates through a sophisticated attack vector that leverages the birthday paradox principle to dramatically reduce the computational effort required to successfully poison DNS caches, making it particularly dangerous for organizations relying on DNS infrastructure for network operations.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the DNS resolver's insufficient randomization of transaction identifiers during recursive query processing. When processing DNS queries for arbitrary hosts, the system fails to adequately randomize the query identifiers that are used to match responses to requests, creating predictable patterns that attackers can exploit. The attack methodology involves generating a massive volume of open DNS queries targeting the same resource record while simultaneously injecting spoofed responses into the network. This approach exploits the mathematical probability of collision inherent in the birthday paradox, where the likelihood of finding a matching transaction identifier increases exponentially with the number of queries generated, rather than requiring brute force attempts that would be computationally prohibitive.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple DNS cache poisoning to potentially compromise the entire network infrastructure that relies on DNS for name resolution services. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to redirect network traffic to malicious destinations, effectively enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, data interception, and service disruption. The efficiency gains from using birthday attack techniques compared to traditional brute force methods mean that attackers can achieve successful cache poisoning with significantly reduced computational resources and time investment, making this vulnerability particularly attractive for automated attack campaigns. Organizations using affected Infoblox DNS One versions face risks including unauthorized access to network resources, data exfiltration, and potential compromise of downstream systems that depend on the poisoned DNS records.
Security mitigations for this vulnerability primarily focus on implementing proper DNS resolver hardening measures and ensuring adequate transaction identifier randomization. Organizations should immediately apply vendor patches and updates to address the specific implementation flaw in the DNS resolution process. Network administrators should also consider implementing DNS security extensions such as DNSSEC to provide additional layers of protection against cache poisoning attacks. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-310, which addresses cryptographic weakness, and maps to ATT&CK technique T1071.004 for application layer protocol DNS, emphasizing the need for robust DNS infrastructure security. Additionally, implementing rate limiting and query monitoring can help detect anomalous DNS activity patterns that may indicate attempted cache poisoning operations, while network segmentation and proper access controls can limit the potential impact of successful attacks.