CVE-2026-117649 in Gitea
Summary
by MITRE • 11/01/2026
The issue timeline API and the web issue page hid cross-reference events that point at issues the reader cannot access, but not "dependency added" and "dependency removed" events. When a readable issue had been linked as a dependency to an issue in a repository the reader cannot access, for example a private repository, any reader of the first issue, including anonymous users of a public repository, received the linked issue's current title, body, state, labels, poster and attachment names through the API, and its repository, number and title on the web page. Creating the link requires access to both issues; comments and attachment downloads of the linked issue stayed protected. Dependency events are now filtered with the same read permission check; a related exposure of unlinked attachment metadata through hidden dependency placeholders was already fixed in 28.2.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/01/2026
The vulnerability described involves an information disclosure flaw within the GitLab platform, specifically affecting how cross-reference and dependency events are rendered to users with varying levels of access permissions. The core technical issue stems from a discrepancy in permission checks applied to different types of event data associated with issues. While the system correctly hid references to issues that were inaccessible to the current user when those references appeared as standard cross-references, it failed to apply equivalent read permission validations for dependency-related events such as "dependency added" and "dependency removed." This inconsistency allowed sensitive metadata from restricted resources to be exposed through legitimate API endpoints and web interface elements intended for public or less-privileged users.
From a technical perspective, the flaw operates by leaking contextual information about private issues when they are linked as dependencies to publicly accessible ones. When an issue in a private repository is added as a dependency to an issue in a public repository, any user viewing the public issue can see specific details about the private one through these unfiltered events. The API exposes the current title, body content, state, labels, poster identity, and attachment names of the linked private issue. Similarly, on the web interface, users are presented with the repository name, issue number, and title of the hidden dependency. This occurs because the backend logic processes these dependency events without verifying whether the requesting user has explicit read access to the target resource, unlike other forms of cross-referencing which do perform this check.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for organizations relying on GitLab for sensitive project management and code development. Although direct actions such as downloading attachments or viewing comments remain protected by proper authentication checks, the exposure of metadata can still lead to serious security consequences. Attackers or unauthorized observers can infer the existence, scope, and nature of private projects based on titles, labels, and issue states. This information leakage aids in reconnaissance efforts, allowing adversaries to map out an organization's internal structure, identify active development areas, and potentially target specific vulnerabilities associated with disclosed project topics. For public repositories, this means that anonymous users can gain insights into the work being done in private sectors of the same organization or its partners if dependencies are shared across boundaries.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-200: Information Exposure, as it involves the unintended disclosure of information to unauthorized actors. It also relates to CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or API, given that the REST API endpoint failed to enforce proper access controls on sensitive data retrieval. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK mapping, this behavior facilitates Reconnaissance activities, specifically T1580: Cloud Infrastructure Discovery and potentially T1083: File and Directory Discovery if metadata reveals file structures or project scopes. The flaw represents a classic case of broken object level authorization where the system assumes that visibility to one resource implies permission to view all associated data points without verifying individual access rights for each piece of information.
Mitigation strategies focus on ensuring consistent enforcement of read permissions across all event types and API responses. Developers must audit dependency handling logic to apply the same rigorous access control checks used for standard cross-references. This involves validating user privileges against every linked issue referenced in dependency events before returning data via APIs or rendering it in web views. Additionally, implementing strict logging and monitoring can help detect unusual patterns of metadata retrieval that might indicate exploitation attempts. Organizations should also review their repository linking practices to minimize the exposure surface by avoiding unnecessary dependencies between public and private projects where sensitive information is handled. The fix described indicates that dependency events are now filtered with read permission checks, aligning them with other cross-reference mechanisms and closing this specific vector for data leakage.