CVE-2026-117681 in Konflux CI
Summary
by MITRE • 10/31/2026
A flaw was found in konflux-ci. This vulnerability allows privilege escalation when the user interface proxy automatically disables Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate verification for connections to internal backend services in environments lacking a default service certificate authority. Because the proxy attaches a cluster-scoped authentication token with user impersonation rights to these requests, an adjacent network attacker capable of intercepting traffic can capture the credentials to gain full administrative control of the cluster.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/31/2026
The vulnerability identified within konflux-ci represents a critical security misconfiguration in how the application handles Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificate verification for internal communications. In environments where no default service certificate authority is configured, the user interface proxy automatically disables TLS certificate validation when establishing connections to backend services. This behavior effectively creates an unencrypted or weakly authenticated channel between the frontend and backend components of the system. The core technical flaw lies in the assumption that such internal traffic is inherently safe from interception, ignoring the reality that adjacent network attackers can perform man-in-the-middle attacks even within trusted local networks if certificate validation is not strictly enforced.
This misconfiguration becomes particularly dangerous due to how authentication tokens are handled during these requests. When the proxy forwards user requests to backend services, it attaches a cluster-scoped authentication token that includes impersonation rights. These tokens grant elevated privileges, allowing the bearer to act as various users or service accounts within the Kubernetes cluster. Because TLS verification is disabled, an attacker positioned on the same network segment can intercept these HTTP requests and extract the raw authentication tokens without detection. The lack of mutual TLS or strict certificate pinning means there is no cryptographic proof of identity for either party in the communication channel, rendering the transmission vulnerable to eavesdropping.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it directly leads to privilege escalation from a potentially low-privileged user interface interaction to full administrative control over the entire cluster. An adjacent network attacker who captures these credentials can reuse them to authenticate against Kubernetes API endpoints or other backend services that trust the same certificate authority chain. With impersonation rights embedded in the token, the attacker can escalate their privileges further, access sensitive secrets, modify deployments, and potentially compromise the integrity of the continuous integration pipeline managed by konflux-ci. This undermines the security boundary between development environments and production infrastructure, allowing lateral movement across services that rely on this compromised authentication mechanism.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation, as the system fails to verify the identity of the remote service before accepting its response or transmitting sensitive data. It also relates to CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials if the default configuration relies on implicit trust rather than explicit certificate management. In terms of attack vectors, this falls under MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078 Valid Accounts, specifically involving legitimate accounts with elevated privileges that are stolen via network sniffing due to lack of encryption integrity checks. The scenario also touches upon T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle, where the attacker intercepts communication between two trusted parties by exploiting weak cryptographic enforcement.
To mitigate this risk, it is imperative to enforce strict TLS certificate verification for all internal service-to-service communications within konflux-ci deployments. Administrators must ensure that a valid and trusted Certificate Authority is configured so that certificates are properly validated rather than bypassed. Implementing mutual TLS (mTLS) would provide an additional layer of security by requiring both client and server authentication, ensuring that only authorized services can communicate with each other. Additionally, restricting network access to the konflux-ci components using network policies can limit exposure to adjacent attackers who might attempt traffic interception. Regular audits of certificate configurations and automated checks for disabled TLS verification in CI/CD pipelines are recommended practices to prevent such misconfigurations from persisting in production environments.