CVE-2002-2280 in OpenBSD
Summary
by MITRE
syslogd on OpenBSD 2.9 through 3.2 does not change the source IP address of syslog packets when the machine s IP addressed is changed without rebooting, e.g. via ifconfig, which can cause incorrect information to be sent to the syslog server.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/12/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2002-2280 affects the syslogd daemon implementation in OpenBSD versions 2.9 through 3.2, representing a significant issue in system logging and network security operations. This flaw manifests when a system's IP address is dynamically modified without a system reboot, typically through network interface configuration commands such as ifconfig. The core problem lies in the syslogd daemon's failure to properly update its source IP address information in outgoing syslog packets, creating a mismatch between the actual network endpoint and the reported source address. This issue fundamentally undermines the integrity of network logging infrastructure and can compromise security monitoring capabilities.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability stems from improper handling of network address changes within the syslogd process lifecycle. When a system administrator modifies an IP address using ifconfig or similar tools without restarting the system, the syslogd daemon retains its original network context information. This creates a scenario where syslog packets continue to be sent with the old source IP address, even though the system's actual network identity has changed. The flaw operates at the network layer protocol implementation level, specifically affecting how the daemon manages socket bindings and network address resolution for logging purposes. This behavior violates fundamental expectations of network service consistency and can be classified under CWE-200, which addresses improper information exposure, and CWE-691, concerning insufficient control of a resource through access control mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple logging inaccuracies to potentially compromise security monitoring and incident response capabilities. When syslog servers receive packets with incorrect source IP addresses, security analysts may misattribute log entries to incorrect systems, leading to false positives in intrusion detection systems or incorrect forensic analysis during security incidents. This misattribution can cause security teams to focus their efforts on non-existent threats while actual security events may go unnoticed or be incorrectly investigated. The vulnerability also affects compliance monitoring and audit trails, as system administrators rely on accurate source information for maintaining security policies and regulatory compliance. From an attacker's perspective, this flaw could potentially be exploited to create confusion in network monitoring systems or to mask malicious activities by making it appear as though attacks originate from different systems than they actually do.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate system administration actions and architectural considerations. The most direct approach involves implementing proper system reboot procedures whenever IP address changes occur, though this is not always practical in production environments. System administrators should also consider implementing network monitoring solutions that can detect and alert on anomalous IP address changes that may affect logging services. The recommended long-term solution involves upgrading to OpenBSD versions that have addressed this specific issue, as newer releases include proper handling of dynamic IP address changes within the syslogd implementation. Network administrators should also implement additional logging validation mechanisms and consider using more robust logging solutions that maintain consistent network context information regardless of address changes. This vulnerability highlights the importance of proper process lifecycle management in security-critical system components and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1070.002, which covers indicator removal on host through deletion of system logs, as incorrect logging information can obscure malicious activities and compromise forensic investigations. Organizations should also consider implementing network segmentation and access control measures that can function independently of potentially compromised logging information to maintain security posture during such incidents.