CVE-2003-0910 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
The NtSetLdtEntries function in the programming interface for the Local Descriptor Table (LDT) in Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 allows local attackers to gain access to kernel memory and execute arbitrary code via an expand-down data segment descriptor descriptor that points to protected memory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/15/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2003-0910 represents a critical privilege escalation flaw within the Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 operating systems. This vulnerability specifically targets the NtSetLdtEntries function which serves as the programming interface for manipulating the Local Descriptor Table (LDT) within the Windows kernel. The LDT is a crucial component of the x86 architecture's memory management system that defines memory segments and their access permissions for individual processes. When exploited, this vulnerability allows local attackers with standard user privileges to escalate their access level and execute arbitrary code within the kernel space, effectively bypassing the operating system's security mechanisms.
The technical flaw resides in the improper validation of expand-down data segment descriptors within the NtSetLdtEntries function implementation. An attacker can craft malicious segment descriptors that point to protected kernel memory regions, exploiting a lack of proper bounds checking and memory access validation. This flaw stems from the function's failure to adequately verify the legitimacy of memory addresses referenced by segment descriptors, particularly those configured as expand-down data segments. The vulnerability manifests when the system processes these malformed descriptors, allowing the attacker to manipulate kernel memory layout and execute code with elevated privileges. This type of vulnerability falls under CWE-122, which specifically addresses improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer, and more broadly relates to CWE-264, which covers permissions, privileges, and access control issues.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching within the Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 environments. Local attackers who successfully exploit this vulnerability can achieve kernel-level privileges, enabling them to bypass all standard security mechanisms including user access controls, process isolation, and memory protection features. Once escalated to kernel mode, the attacker gains complete control over the system, allowing for persistent backdoor installation, data exfiltration, system modification, and privilege escalation to other users or administrators. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it requires minimal privileges to exploit, making it attractive to attackers who may have initially gained access through other means such as phishing or social engineering attacks. From an attack framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to the privilege escalation techniques described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Privilege Escalation tactic, specifically targeting the Windows API and kernel-level access methods.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2003-0910 focus on both immediate system hardening and long-term architectural improvements. Microsoft released security patches for Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 that corrected the validation logic within the NtSetLdtEntries function, ensuring proper bounds checking and memory address validation. System administrators should immediately apply these patches to all affected systems and implement additional security measures including disabling unnecessary user privileges, implementing strict access controls, and monitoring for suspicious LDT manipulation activities. The vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper kernel memory management and input validation in operating system security. Organizations should also consider implementing intrusion detection systems that monitor for unusual LDT modifications and maintain comprehensive security monitoring to detect potential exploitation attempts. Given that Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 are legacy systems no longer supported by Microsoft, the most effective long-term solution involves migrating to supported operating system versions that have addressed such fundamental security flaws through improved memory management and privilege control mechanisms.