CVE-2010-0221 in DataTraveler Secure
Summary
by MITRE
Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox (DTBB), DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition (DTSP), and DataTraveler Elite Privacy Edition (DTEP) USB flash drives validate passwords with a program running on the host computer rather than the device hardware, which allows physically proximate attackers to access the cleartext drive contents via a modified program.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/27/2017
The vulnerability identified in CVE-2010-0221 affects Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox DTBB, DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition DTSP, and DataTraveler Elite Privacy Edition DTEP USB flash drives that implement hardware-based encryption. These devices utilize a security model where password validation occurs on the host computer rather than being handled by dedicated hardware components within the USB device itself. This architectural design flaw creates a significant security weakness that directly violates the principle of defense in depth as outlined in cybersecurity frameworks. The implementation represents a deviation from secure hardware design practices where cryptographic operations should be isolated within the device's secure element to prevent tampering and unauthorized access.
The technical flaw stems from the host-based password validation mechanism that allows attackers with physical proximity to the device to manipulate the authentication process. When a user attempts to access the encrypted drive, the USB device communicates with a validation program running on the host computer rather than performing the verification within its own secure hardware environment. This approach creates an attack surface where malicious actors can modify the host validation program to bypass the password protection entirely, effectively rendering the hardware encryption useless. The vulnerability operates at the application layer as defined by the ATT&CK framework, specifically within the credential access category where adversaries can obtain credentials through program modification. This type of flaw is categorized as a weakness in authentication mechanisms and represents a failure in secure boot and execution environment principles.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for users who rely on these devices for sensitive data storage. An attacker with physical access to the device can simply replace the legitimate validation program with a modified version that accepts any password or bypasses authentication entirely. This allows complete access to the cleartext contents of the drive without requiring advanced technical skills or specialized equipment beyond basic physical proximity. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it leverages the trust relationship between the USB device and the host operating system, exploiting the assumption that legitimate programs are running on the host. This vulnerability undermines the fundamental security promise of hardware encryption and creates a false sense of security for users who believe their data is protected by robust cryptographic mechanisms. The impact extends beyond individual users to organizations that may have deployed these devices for confidential data storage, potentially exposing sensitive information through simple physical access attacks.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require both immediate and long-term approaches to address the inherent design flaw. Users should immediately cease using these specific device models until a firmware update is available that implements hardware-based password validation, which would align with the principle of secure by design as recommended by NIST guidelines. Organizations should conduct comprehensive inventory assessments to identify all affected devices and implement temporary measures such as additional physical security controls, enhanced access logging, and regular security audits. The recommended solution involves firmware modifications that move password validation from the host computer to the device's secure hardware component, ensuring that cryptographic operations cannot be tampered with by external programs. This approach would align with the secure element concept defined in CWE-310 and would provide the necessary hardware isolation to prevent the type of program modification attacks that exploit this vulnerability. Additionally, users should consider alternative encryption solutions that implement proper hardware-based authentication mechanisms, as the current design fundamentally fails to provide the security assurances that users expect from hardware encryption products.