CVE-2010-0222 in DataTraveler Secure
Summary
by MITRE
Kingston DataTraveler BlackBox (DTBB), DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition (DTSP), and DataTraveler Elite Privacy Edition (DTEP) USB flash drives use a fixed 256-bit key for obtaining access to the cleartext drive contents, which makes it easier for physically proximate attackers to read or modify data by determining and providing this key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/18/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-0222 affects several Kingston USB flash drive models including the DataTraveler BlackBox DTBB, DataTraveler Secure Privacy Edition DTSP, and DataTraveler Elite Privacy Edition DTEP. These devices implement hardware-based encryption to protect data stored on the USB drives, but the implementation contains a critical flaw that undermines the security assurances provided by the encryption mechanism. The vulnerability stems from the use of a fixed 256-bit encryption key that is hardcoded into the device firmware, creating a fundamental weakness in the cryptographic design that renders the encryption ineffective against determined attackers.
This security flaw represents a significant failure in the principle of key management and cryptographic implementation, specifically violating the security requirements outlined in the Common Weakness Enumeration standard CWE-327 which addresses the use of weak cryptographic algorithms and hardcoded keys. The fixed nature of the encryption key means that any attacker with physical access to the device can potentially determine the key through reverse engineering or by exploiting the device's firmware structure. This weakness transforms what should be a robust security mechanism into a vulnerability that can be exploited by attackers who are physically proximate to the device, making it particularly concerning for users who store sensitive data on these drives.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data theft, as it allows attackers to not only read confidential information but also to modify or corrupt data stored on the affected USB drives. This creates a scenario where an attacker with physical access can bypass all security measures designed to protect the data, effectively rendering the encryption worthless. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires only physical proximity to the device, eliminating the need for sophisticated network-based attacks or complex exploitation techniques. This makes the vulnerability especially problematic for users who store sensitive corporate or personal information on these drives and may leave them unattended in public places or shared workspaces.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with the tactics described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the Tactic of Credential Access and Defense Evasion, where attackers can obtain access to encrypted data without needing to overcome complex authentication mechanisms. Organizations and individuals using these devices should consider immediate mitigation strategies including replacing the affected USB drives with models that implement proper key management, such as those using unique keys generated per device or those implementing secure key storage mechanisms. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of proper cryptographic implementation practices and the necessity of avoiding hardcoded keys in security-sensitive applications, as specified in industry standards and best practices for secure software development.