CVE-2012-6335 in AVG AntiVirus
Summary
by MITRE
The Anti-theft service in AVG AntiVirus for Android allows physically proximate attackers to provide arbitrary location data via a "commonly available simple GPS location spoofer."
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/06/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2012-6335 represents a critical security flaw within the anti-theft service component of AVG AntiVirus for Android, a widely deployed mobile security solution. This weakness specifically targets the location tracking functionality that is typically employed by anti-theft services to locate lost or stolen devices. The vulnerability arises from insufficient validation of location data received by the anti-theft service, creating an avenue for malicious actors to manipulate the system's location awareness. The flaw is particularly concerning because it leverages a commonly available tool that can be easily accessed by attackers, making the exploitation path straightforward and accessible to adversaries with minimal technical expertise. This vulnerability directly impacts the core functionality of device recovery services that rely on accurate geolocation data to assist users in locating their lost devices.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the anti-theft service's failure to properly authenticate or validate GPS location data sources. When a device is reported as lost or stolen, the anti-theft service typically sends location requests to the device, which then responds with GPS coordinates. However, the AVG AntiVirus for Android implementation does not adequately verify the legitimacy of these location responses, allowing attackers to inject fake GPS coordinates through readily available spoofing tools. This represents a classic case of insufficient input validation and trust model weakness, where the system blindly accepts location data without proper verification mechanisms. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-20, which describes "Improper Input Validation," and CWE-345, which addresses "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity." The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it requires minimal sophistication and can be executed using standard GPS spoofer applications that are publicly available.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple location manipulation, fundamentally compromising the effectiveness of anti-theft services that depend on accurate geolocation data. Attackers can exploit this weakness to either prevent legitimate recovery attempts by providing false locations or to gain unauthorized access to device functionality by manipulating the anti-theft service's location-based responses. In practical scenarios, this could allow adversaries to bypass location-based security measures, potentially enabling further exploitation of the device or preventing legitimate owners from recovering their property. The vulnerability also creates a broader security risk as it demonstrates the lack of proper authentication mechanisms within the anti-theft service architecture. According to ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability relates to T1566.002 - "Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment" and T1071.004 - "Application Layer Protocol: DNS" in terms of how attackers might leverage location spoofing to maintain persistent access or evade detection. The compromised service could also be used as a stepping stone for more sophisticated attacks, as the anti-theft service often has elevated privileges and access to sensitive device information.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2012-6335 should focus on implementing robust location data validation and authentication mechanisms within the anti-theft service. Security measures must include cryptographic verification of location data, implementation of multiple location source validation, and establishment of trust models that verify the authenticity of GPS responses. Organizations should also consider implementing rate limiting and anomaly detection for location data updates to identify and reject suspicious patterns. The solution requires strengthening the anti-theft service's trust model to ensure that location data cannot be easily manipulated by external tools. Additionally, regular security assessments should be conducted to verify that location validation mechanisms remain effective against evolving spoofing techniques. System administrators should also implement monitoring protocols to detect unusual location-based activities that may indicate exploitation attempts. The fix should align with industry best practices for secure mobile application development and incorporate principles from NIST SP 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27001 standards to ensure comprehensive protection against location-based attacks.