CVE-2026-12765 in Langflow OSSinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 09/14/2026

IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an unauthenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 09/14/2026

The vulnerability identified in IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw that compromises the integrity of the application's interaction with external resources. Server-side request forgery, commonly referred to as SSRF, occurs when an application retrieves data from a URL provided by a user without sufficiently validating or sanitizing the input. In this specific instance, the Langflow framework fails to enforce strict controls on the destination URLs requested during its operational processes. This lack of validation allows an attacker who has access to the interface where these requests are initiated to manipulate the target address. Because the vulnerability affects unauthenticated users, it significantly lowers the barrier for exploitation, enabling any individual with network connectivity to the Langflow instance to attempt malicious payloads without needing valid credentials or prior authentication.

From a technical perspective, this flaw stems from insufficient input validation mechanisms within the application logic that handles URL parameters. When an attacker supplies a specially crafted Uniform Resource Locator as part of their request, the server processes it and initiates an outbound connection on behalf of the user. This behavior is particularly dangerous because the requests originate from the server itself rather than directly from the client's machine. Consequently, these forged requests can bypass firewalls or other network security controls that typically restrict direct external access to internal systems. The attacker can leverage this capability to probe internal networks, accessing services and resources that are not exposed to the public internet but are reachable by the Langflow server. This effectively turns the vulnerable application into a proxy for attacking internal infrastructure.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, primarily due to its potential role as an initial vector for broader network compromise. An unauthenticated attacker can utilize SSRF to perform network enumeration, identifying active hosts and open ports within the local network segment where Langflow resides. This reconnaissance activity provides valuable intelligence that facilitates further attacks against other systems in the environment. Furthermore, if internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints or administrative interfaces are accessible from the server's network path, an attacker could potentially extract sensitive configuration data, authentication tokens, or credentials stored in those locations. The ability to send unauthorized requests also means that attackers might interact with backend APIs or databases directly through the Langflow application, leading to potential data exfiltration or manipulation of internal services without direct access to their endpoints.

This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery as a weakness where web applications retrieve resources from URLs provided by users without proper validation. It also maps to the MITRE ATT&CK framework under techniques such as T1071 Application Layer Protocol for command and control or data exfiltration if used in conjunction with other exploits, and more broadly represents reconnaissance activities like T1046 Network Service Discovery. The exploitation of this flaw allows attackers to pivot from a web application vulnerability into deeper network intrusions, highlighting the importance of treating SSRF as a high-severity issue that requires immediate attention.

To mitigate this risk, organizations running IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 should immediately upgrade to version 1.10.3 or later where these validation checks have been implemented and strengthened. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, defensive measures such as implementing strict allowlists for outbound network connections can help restrict the server from communicating with unauthorized internal IP ranges. Additionally, deploying web application firewalls that detect and block SSRF patterns in HTTP requests may provide a layer of defense against exploitation attempts. It is also advisable to isolate Langflow instances within restricted network zones to limit their ability to reach sensitive internal resources should an attacker succeed in exploiting this vulnerability. Regular security audits and penetration testing focused on input validation and outbound request controls are recommended to ensure that similar weaknesses do not exist elsewhere in the application stack.

Responsible

Ibm

Reservation

06/20/2026

Disclosure

09/14/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00000

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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