CVE-2017-8222 in Wireless IP Camera WIFICAMinfo

Summary

by MITRE

Wireless IP Camera (P2P) WIFICAM devices have an "Apple Production IOS Push Services" private RSA key and certificate stored in /system/www/pem/ck.pem inside the firmware, which allows attackers to obtain sensitive information.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 08/14/2024

The vulnerability identified as CVE-2017-8222 represents a critical security flaw in Wireless IP Camera devices manufactured by WIFICAM, specifically those utilizing P2P (Peer-to-Peer) connectivity protocols. This issue stems from the improper storage of cryptographic materials within the device firmware, creating a persistent security risk that affects the overall integrity and confidentiality of the connected network infrastructure. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it exposes a private RSA key and associated certificate that are typically reserved for legitimate Apple Push Notification Service communications, indicating a fundamental misunderstanding of security practices during the device development lifecycle.

The technical flaw manifests through the insecure storage of the Apple Production IOS Push Services private key and certificate within the /system/www/pem/ck.pem file path within the device firmware. This location suggests that the developers embedded the cryptographic materials directly into the system files rather than implementing proper key management practices. The presence of this private key within the device firmware allows attackers to perform cryptographic operations that should remain protected within Apple's secure infrastructure. The vulnerability falls under CWE-310 - Cryptographic Issues, specifically addressing improper key management and the exposure of private cryptographic materials in insecure locations. This flaw enables attackers to potentially forge legitimate Apple Push notifications, impersonate the device in Apple's ecosystem, or extract sensitive information that was intended to remain confidential.

The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure, creating significant risks for network security and device integrity. Attackers who gain access to this private key can exploit it to perform man-in-the-middle attacks against the device, potentially compromising the entire network infrastructure that relies on secure communications. The exposure of the private key enables attackers to decrypt communications between the device and legitimate Apple services, potentially accessing sensitive data or gaining unauthorized access to connected systems. This vulnerability particularly affects the security posture of IoT deployments where these cameras are used, as the compromised device can serve as a foothold for broader network infiltration. According to ATT&CK framework, this vulnerability maps to T1566 - Phishing and T1071.1 - Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, as attackers can leverage the exposed key to conduct sophisticated social engineering attacks or establish persistent access through compromised communication channels.

Mitigation strategies for CVE-2017-8222 require immediate action from device administrators and manufacturers to address the root cause of the vulnerability. The primary remediation involves replacing the exposed private key with a newly generated cryptographic pair and ensuring that all future firmware updates properly implement secure key management practices. Organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate affected devices from critical infrastructure, deploy network monitoring solutions to detect anomalous communications patterns, and conduct thorough security audits of all IoT devices within the network. The vulnerability highlights the importance of following secure development practices and implementing proper key lifecycle management as outlined in NIST SP 800-57 and ISO/IEC 15408 standards. Additionally, device manufacturers must ensure that cryptographic materials are stored in secure hardware modules rather than in plain text files within the firmware, preventing unauthorized access to sensitive cryptographic keys. Regular security assessments and penetration testing should be conducted to identify similar vulnerabilities in other networked devices that may have been similarly misconfigured.

Reservation

04/25/2017

Disclosure

04/25/2017

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

Exploit

Download

EPSS

0.07265

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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