CVE-2018-19982 in MC01507L Z-Wave S0
Summary
by MITRE
An issue was discovered on KT MC01507L Z-Wave S0 devices. It occurs because HPKP is not implemented. The communication architecture is APP > Server > Controller (HUB) > Node (products which are controlled by HUB). The prerequisite is that the attacker is on the same network as the target HUB, and can use IP Changer to change destination IP addresses (of all packets whose destination IP address is Server) to a proxy-server IP address. This allows sniffing of cleartext between Server and Controller. The cleartext command data is transmitted to Controller using the proxy server's fake certificate, and it is able to control each Node of the HUB. Also, by operating HUB in Z-Wave Pairing Mode, it is possible to obtain the Z-Wave network key.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/19/2020
The vulnerability identified in CVE-2018-19982 affects KT MC01507L Z-Wave S0 devices, representing a critical security flaw in home automation systems that operates at the intersection of network security and IoT device management. This issue stems from the complete absence of HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) implementation within the communication architecture, which fundamentally weakens the security posture of the entire Z-Wave ecosystem. The affected system follows a layered communication model where applications interact with servers, which then communicate with controllers (HUBs), and ultimately control individual nodes within the network. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it demonstrates how insufficient cryptographic security measures can create cascading weaknesses throughout an entire network infrastructure.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability requires an attacker to be positioned on the same network segment as the target HUB, a scenario that represents a common attack vector in local network environments. The attacker can leverage IP changing capabilities to redirect traffic from the legitimate server to a malicious proxy server, effectively creating a man-in-the-middle position within the communication chain. This attack methodology specifically targets the lack of HPKP implementation, which would normally prevent the acceptance of unauthorized certificates and protect against certificate substitution attacks. The absence of this security mechanism allows the attacker's proxy server to present a fake certificate that the system accepts without proper validation, enabling the interception and manipulation of cleartext command data that flows between the server and controller components.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple data interception, as it provides attackers with complete control over the Z-Wave network's node devices through the compromised controller. Once the attacker successfully establishes the proxy server position and gains access to the cleartext command data, they can execute arbitrary commands against all connected nodes within the network, effectively taking complete control of the home automation system. The attack scenario becomes even more dangerous when considering that the HUB can be operated in Z-Wave Pairing Mode, which exposes the Z-Wave network key through a process that bypasses normal security protocols. This key exposure creates a persistent vulnerability that allows attackers to maintain long-term access to the network, as they can pair new devices and gain additional control points within the system.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with multiple CWE categories including CWE-310, which addresses cryptographic weaknesses, and CWE-295, which covers improper certificate validation. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving credential access through network sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks, specifically T1041 for data compression and T1566 for credential access through social engineering. The attack chain demonstrates how the absence of proper certificate pinning creates an environment where attackers can establish persistent network positions without requiring sophisticated attack vectors or physical access to the devices themselves. Organizations and individuals relying on such systems face significant risks including unauthorized access to home security systems, potential privacy violations through monitoring of automated home activities, and the possibility of cascading failures throughout interconnected IoT ecosystems. The vulnerability highlights the critical importance of implementing robust certificate validation mechanisms and proper cryptographic security measures in IoT devices, particularly those handling sensitive home automation and security functions.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper HPKP policies, ensuring that all network communications utilize certificate pinning mechanisms, and establishing secure communication channels between all components of the Z-Wave ecosystem. Network administrators should consider implementing additional security controls such as network segmentation, encrypted communication protocols, and regular security audits to prevent unauthorized access to local network segments. The vulnerability also underscores the necessity of updating firmware regularly and implementing proper security configurations that prevent the use of default settings or weak authentication mechanisms within IoT devices. Organizations should also consider deploying network monitoring solutions that can detect unusual traffic patterns or unauthorized proxy server activities that might indicate such attacks are occurring within their networks.