CVE-2019-20002 in WebHelpDesk
Summary
by MITRE
Formula Injection exists in the export feature in SolarWinds WebHelpDesk 12.7.1 via a value (provided by a low-privileged user in the Subject field of a help request form) that is mishandled in a TicketActions/view?tab=group TSV export by an admin user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/06/2025
The vulnerability CVE-2019-20002 represents a formula injection flaw within SolarWinds WebHelpDesk version 12.7.1 that demonstrates a critical weakness in how the application handles user input during export operations. This issue specifically manifests when a low-privileged user provides malicious input in the Subject field of a help request form, which subsequently gets processed during TSV export operations performed by administrative users. The vulnerability stems from inadequate input sanitization and improper handling of special characters that can be interpreted as spreadsheet formulas by the export functionality.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability aligns with CWE-154, which describes improper handling of formulas in spreadsheet applications, and represents a variant of command injection where user-provided data can execute unintended operations within the export context. When administrative users export ticket data to TSV format, the system fails to properly escape or sanitize the Subject field content, allowing specially crafted input to be interpreted as executable formulas by spreadsheet applications. This creates a vector where malicious payloads can be embedded within the exported data and executed when the file is opened in applications like Microsoft Excel or Google Sheets.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it enables a privilege escalation attack path where low-privilege users can potentially execute arbitrary code on systems where administrative users open the exported TSV files. The attack requires minimal user interaction from the target admin, making it particularly dangerous in enterprise environments where administrative users regularly handle sensitive data exports. The vulnerability can be exploited to execute malicious macros, launch external commands, or perform data exfiltration through the spreadsheet application's formula execution capabilities.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing comprehensive input validation and output encoding for all user-provided data within export functions, as recommended by the ATT&CK framework's mitigation techniques for command injection and input validation. Organizations should enforce strict sanitization of all fields before export operations, implement proper escaping of special characters that could be interpreted as formulas, and consider using alternative export formats that are less susceptible to formula interpretation. Additionally, administrative users should be educated about the risks of opening untrusted exported files, and organizations should consider implementing automated security scanning for exported data to detect potentially malicious content before it reaches end users.