CVE-2026-47664 in Pathling
Summary
by MITRE • 08/08/2026
Pathling is a set of tools that make it easier to use FHIR and clinical terminology within health data analytics. Prior to version 2.0.0 of Pathling Server, the `$import-pnp` operation in Pathling Server accepts a caller-supplied `exportUrl` and uses it as the remote FHIR Bulk Export endpoint without constraining it to a trusted source. When PNP credentials are configured, Pathling builds a credentialed bulk-export client targeting the caller-chosen host, downloads manifest-selected files, and then reclassifies those staged files as trusted local `file://` imports - bypassing the configured `allowableSources` allowlist that protects the ordinary `$import` operation. This is fixed in Pathling Server 2.0.0. As a workaround, disable the `$import-pnp` operation (`pathling.operations.importPnpEnabled=false`) or do not configure PNP credentials.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/08/2026
The vulnerability described in this CVE affects Pathling Server versions prior to 2.0.0 and relates to improper input validation and access control within the `$import-pnp` operation. This flaw represents a critical security weakness that allows remote attackers to bypass intended security controls by manipulating the exportUrl parameter. The issue stems from the server's failure to validate or constrain the caller-supplied exportUrl against a trusted source whitelist, creating an attack vector where malicious actors can redirect the system to download data from unauthorized external endpoints.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability occurs when Pathling Server processes the `$import-pnp` operation with configured PNP credentials. The system constructs a bulk-export client targeting the attacker-controlled host specified in the exportUrl parameter, downloads manifest-selected files from that remote endpoint, and then reclassifies these staged files as trusted local file imports. This process effectively bypasses the normal security controls that would normally restrict imports to only sources defined in the allowableSources allowlist, which protects the standard `$import` operation from unauthorized external data sources.
This vulnerability creates significant operational impact by potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code or access sensitive clinical data through a bypass of the configured security restrictions. The attack scenario involves an attacker providing a malicious exportUrl that points to a compromised server or unauthorized data source, enabling them to import potentially harmful data or gain access to restricted clinical information. The vulnerability affects the integrity and confidentiality of health data analytics systems, as it allows bypassing the intended security boundaries designed to protect against external threats.
The flaw aligns with CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) and CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) categories, representing a classic case where insufficient validation of user-supplied input combined with inadequate access controls creates a privilege escalation vulnerability. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1078 (Valid Accounts) and T1566 (Phishing) as attackers could leverage compromised accounts or social engineering to gain access to the system and then exploit this weakness. The vulnerability also relates to T1213 (Data from Information Repositories) and T1499 (Endpoint Termination) since it allows unauthorized data access and potential system compromise through external data sources.
The security implications extend beyond simple data access, as this vulnerability could enable attackers to inject malicious data into clinical analytics systems, potentially affecting patient care decisions or exposing sensitive health information. The bypass of the allowableSources allowlist represents a fundamental failure in the principle of least privilege, where the system allows arbitrary external data sources to be processed without proper authorization. Organizations using Pathling Server prior to version 2.0.0 should implement immediate mitigations by either disabling the vulnerable `$import-pnp` operation entirely or removing PNP credentials from their configuration.
The recommended remediation involves upgrading to Pathling Server version 2.0.0 or later, which addresses this vulnerability through proper input validation and access control enforcement. Organizations should also consider implementing network-level controls to restrict outbound connections from the Pathling Server to prevent unauthorized external data sources from being accessed. Additionally, monitoring for unusual import patterns or unexpected file downloads from external endpoints can help detect potential exploitation attempts. Security teams should review their current PNP credential configurations and ensure that only trusted sources are allowed for bulk export operations.
The vulnerability demonstrates the importance of proper input validation in healthcare systems where data integrity is paramount, as well as the need for robust access control mechanisms in clinical data analytics platforms. Healthcare organizations should conduct thorough security assessments of their FHIR implementations to identify similar vulnerabilities that could compromise patient data or system integrity. The fix implemented in Pathling Server 2.0.0 likely includes enhanced validation of the exportUrl parameter and enforcement of the allowableSources allowlist for all import operations, ensuring that only authorized external sources can be used for bulk data imports. This represents a critical improvement in protecting sensitive health information from unauthorized access through bypass mechanisms that could otherwise compromise entire clinical analytics ecosystems.