CVE-2026-47363 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 08/07/2026
The launcher activity AppActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" and no permission guard. On every onCreate and onNewIntent, it invokes Intent.getUserSession(), an extension that deserializes a full UserSession — user identity, OAuth access and refresh tokens, host, organization, datacenter, and permissions — from Bundle extras keyed under the com.datadog.app.* namespace. This extension lives in the main sourceset, not a test-only sourceset, despite a misleading comment referencing internal test fixtures. Any application installed on the device can invoke the launcher with arbitrary session extras. The startup pipeline accepts the injected session, persists it to user storage, optionally rotates persisted token storage when an OAUTH_OVERRIDE_TOKEN extra is set, and performs an automatic login under the attacker-chosen identity. The session preparer returns Ready without contacting the backend whenever the injected access token is not flagged as expired-or-expiring-soon, so no server-side token introspection takes place before auto-login. Preconditions: the Datadog application installed on the victim device, and a zero-permission co-installed malicious application. The attacker must possess any OAuth access token they are willing to have the victim use, including the attacker's own Datadog tokens.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical privilege escalation flaw in the Datadog Android monitoring application that stems from improper activity export configuration and insecure session handling mechanisms. The core issue manifests in the AppActivity launcher component which is explicitly declared as android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" but lacks any permission restrictions or security guards. This configuration creates an attack surface where any application installed on the device can invoke this activity and inject arbitrary session data through Bundle extras. The vulnerability operates at the application-level attack surface defined by CWE-284, specifically targeting improper access control mechanisms in Android applications.
The technical exploitation occurs through the Intent.getUserSession() extension function which deserializes complete UserSession objects containing sensitive information including user identity details, OAuth access and refresh tokens, host information, organization data, datacenter specifications, and comprehensive permission sets. This deserialization process operates within the main application sourceset rather than a test-only environment despite misleading comments suggesting otherwise, indicating poor security architecture practices. The session data is processed through the application's startup pipeline where it gets persisted to user storage without proper validation or authentication checks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability enables attackers to perform unauthorized automatic logins under arbitrary identities chosen by the attacker. When the injected session contains a non-expired-or-expiring-soon OAuth access token, the session preparer component returns Ready status immediately without performing any backend token introspection or validation. This behavior creates a persistent authentication bypass where the malicious application can establish legitimate user sessions without requiring the victim to provide credentials or undergo proper authentication processes. The vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004 for Valid Accounts and T1531 for Account Access Removal, as it enables unauthorized access to Datadog monitoring services through session hijacking.
The attack requires only a zero-permission co-installed malicious application on the victim device, making it particularly dangerous in scenarios where users install applications without considering their security implications. Attackers can leverage any OAuth access token they possess, including their own Datadog tokens, to impersonate legitimate users and gain access to monitoring data, configuration settings, and potentially sensitive operational information. This vulnerability essentially removes the application's ability to verify session authenticity and creates a persistent backdoor for unauthorized access. The lack of server-side validation before auto-login represents a fundamental flaw in the authentication architecture, as defined by CWE-347, which allows for improper validation of certificates and authentication tokens.
Mitigation strategies should include removing the android:exported="true" declaration from the AppActivity component or implementing proper permission checks using android:permission attributes. The application should also implement robust session validation mechanisms that perform server-side token introspection before allowing automatic login operations. Additionally, the deserialization process for UserSession objects needs to be secured with proper input validation and sandboxing measures to prevent arbitrary data injection. Security teams should consider implementing runtime application self-protection mechanisms and monitoring for unauthorized activity patterns that could indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability demonstrates a critical failure in Android security model implementation where exported components lack proper access control enforcement, creating a direct path for privilege escalation attacks as outlined in the Android security best practices and OWASP Mobile Top 10 framework.