CVE-2020-10263 in XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06
Summary
by MITRE
An issue was discovered on XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06 1.52.4. Attackers can get root shell by accessing the UART interface and then they can (i) read Wi-Fi SSID or password, (ii) read the dialogue text files between users and XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06, (iii) use Text-To-Speech tools pretend XIAOMI speakers' voice achieve social engineering attacks, (iv) eavesdrop on users and record what XIAOMI XIAOAI speaker Pro LX06 hears, (v) modify system files, (vi) use commands to send any IR code through IR emitter on XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro LX06, (vii) stop voice assistant service, (viii) enable the XIAOMI XIAOAI Speaker Pro’ SSH or TELNET service as a backdoor, (IX) tamper with the router configuration of the router in the local area networks.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/17/2024
This vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in Xiaomi's Xiaoai Speaker Pro LX06 device, specifically affecting firmware version 1.52.4. The issue stems from an insecure configuration that exposes the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) interface, which serves as a direct pathway for attackers to gain root-level access to the device's operating system. The UART interface typically provides low-level debugging access to embedded systems, and its exposure without proper authentication mechanisms creates a severe attack surface that bypasses all normal security controls. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-250, which addresses "Execute Code with Unusual or Unconventional Path" and CWE-78, addressing "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in OS Command Injection," as attackers can leverage the exposed interface to execute arbitrary commands with full system privileges.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple unauthorized access, creating a comprehensive attack vector that enables extensive data exfiltration and system manipulation. Once root access is obtained, attackers can directly read sensitive information including Wi-Fi network credentials, which violates fundamental network security principles and creates persistent access points for lateral movement within local networks. The ability to access dialogue text files between users and the speaker presents significant privacy risks, potentially exposing personal conversations and sensitive user data to unauthorized parties. Additionally, the vulnerability allows for sophisticated social engineering attacks through Text-To-Speech functionality, enabling attackers to impersonate the device's voice and manipulate users into performing actions that compromise their security. This capability directly aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566, which covers "Phishing for Information," and demonstrates how physical device compromise can lead to broader social engineering campaigns.
The exploitation of this vulnerability enables attackers to perform comprehensive system surveillance and manipulation activities that fundamentally compromise the device's security posture. Eavesdropping capabilities allow real-time monitoring of conversations, while the ability to record audio data creates persistent surveillance mechanisms that violate user privacy expectations. System file modification capabilities enable attackers to alter device behavior, potentially creating persistent backdoors or disabling security features entirely. The IR emitter functionality provides additional attack vectors for controlling other devices within the network, while the ability to stop voice assistant services creates denial-of-service conditions that disrupt legitimate user access. Furthermore, the vulnerability allows for enabling SSH or TELNET services, which creates persistent remote access mechanisms that can be used for long-term network infiltration and data exfiltration. The capability to tamper with router configurations represents the most severe aspect of this vulnerability, as it enables attackers to modify network infrastructure settings and potentially compromise the entire local network, violating network security principles and creating persistent access points for further attacks. This multi-faceted attack capability aligns with ATT&CK matrix techniques covering privilege escalation, persistence, defense evasion, and credential access, making this vulnerability particularly dangerous in environments where device security is paramount. The exposure of this vulnerability through an accessible UART interface demonstrates a fundamental failure in embedded device security design and highlights the critical importance of secure boot processes, proper interface management, and comprehensive security testing for IoT devices before deployment.