CVE-2024-23953 in Hive
Summary
by MITRE • 01/28/2025
Use of Arrays.equals() in LlapSignerImpl in Apache Hive to compare message signatures allows attacker to forge a valid signature for an arbitrary message byte by byte. The attacker should be an authorized user of the product to perform this attack. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.0.0, which fixes this issue.
The problem occurs when an application doesn’t use a constant-time algorithm for validating a signature. The method Arrays.equals() returns false right away when it sees that one of the input’s bytes are different. It means that the comparison time depends on the contents of the arrays. This little thing may allow an attacker to forge a valid signature for an arbitrary message byte by byte. So it might allow malicious users to submit splits/work with selected signatures to LLAP without running as a privileged user, potentially leading to DDoS attack.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/14/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2024-23953 resides within the LlapSignerImpl component of Apache Hive, a distributed data warehouse system that processes large datasets. This flaw represents a classic implementation of timing attack vulnerability that exploits the non-constant time nature of the Arrays.equals() method when comparing cryptographic signatures. The vulnerability specifically affects systems where signature validation occurs using this method, creating a window of opportunity for attackers to perform signature forgery through systematic byte-by-byte comparison attacks. The issue is particularly concerning because it requires only authorized user access to exploit, making it a significant concern for internal threat scenarios where privilege escalation is not necessary.
The technical root cause stems from the use of Arrays.equals() which performs a sequential comparison of array elements and terminates immediately upon detecting any mismatch. This behavior creates a timing differential that can be measured and exploited by an attacker to determine the correct values of signature bytes one at a time. When an attacker submits a forged signature, they can observe the response time differences between their attempts, allowing them to reconstruct a valid signature for arbitrary messages. This timing-based approach enables attackers to bypass signature verification mechanisms entirely, as the comparison time varies directly with the number of matching bytes, providing a clear signal to the attacker about the correctness of their guesses. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-203: Information Exposure Through Timing Discrepancy, which specifically addresses the disclosure of information via timing differences in cryptographic operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple signature forgery, potentially enabling attackers to perform unauthorized operations within the LLAP (Low Latency Analytical Processing) framework of Apache Hive. An attacker could manipulate split processing and work assignments by submitting forged signatures, effectively allowing them to execute arbitrary workloads without proper authorization. This capability could be leveraged to conduct distributed denial-of-service attacks against the Hive cluster by overwhelming the system with forged workloads that appear legitimate. The attack scenario becomes particularly dangerous when considering that the attacker only needs authorized user status, which could be obtained through various means including credential theft, insider threats, or compromised accounts. The vulnerability essentially allows for privilege escalation within the system's authorization boundaries, potentially enabling attackers to perform operations that should be restricted to privileged users.
Mitigation of this vulnerability requires immediate upgrade to Apache Hive version 4.0.0, which implements proper constant-time signature comparison algorithms to prevent timing attacks. Organizations should also consider implementing additional monitoring for unusual signature validation patterns and response time variations that might indicate exploitation attempts. Security teams should review their access controls and user authorization mechanisms to ensure that only necessary users have access to LLAP functionality. The fix addresses the core issue by replacing the vulnerable Arrays.equals() implementation with a constant-time comparison method that ensures equal execution time regardless of input values, thereby eliminating the timing differential that enabled the attack. This approach aligns with the ATT&CK framework's mitigation strategies for timing-based information disclosure attacks, specifically targeting the T1211: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation technique. Organizations should also implement proper security testing procedures including timing attack simulations to verify that cryptographic implementations are resistant to such vulnerabilities.