CVE-2026-10079 in Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes
Summary
by MITRE • 07/31/2026
A flaw was found in Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes (RHACS). When processing Kubernetes Deployments, ACS replaces deployment identity metadata based on the openshift.io/encoded-deployment-config label. A user with permission to create Deployments can set this label to "null", causing ACS to treat the workload as having empty UID, name and labels and namespace "default". This bypasses deploy-time policy detection and enforcement visibility, prevents correct persistence in Central and breaks violation reporting and compliance correlation for the affected deployment.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/31/2026
This vulnerability exists within Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes (RHACS) where the system processes Kubernetes Deployments with a specific handling mechanism that can be exploited through manipulation of metadata labels. The flaw specifically targets how ACS interprets the openshift.io/encoded-deployment-config label during deployment processing, creating a critical bypass opportunity for unauthorized users who possess minimal permissions to create Deployments within the cluster environment.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from improper validation and handling of the openshift.io/encoded-deployment-config label value. When a user sets this label to "null", the system's parsing logic fails to properly validate or sanitize the input, leading to a cascading effect where deployment identity metadata becomes malformed or completely empty. This occurs because the ACS platform assumes that when this specific label is present with a null value, it should treat the deployment as having no meaningful identity information, effectively stripping away all identifying characteristics including UID, name, labels, and namespace information.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple misconfiguration, creating significant security implications for organizations relying on RHACS for compliance monitoring and policy enforcement. When deployments are processed with empty metadata, the system's deploy-time policy detection mechanisms become ineffective as they cannot properly identify or correlate violations against legitimate deployment characteristics. This creates a scenario where malicious or improperly configured deployments can operate without visibility in the Central management system, allowing potentially harmful workloads to bypass security controls while maintaining complete anonymity within the monitoring framework.
The vulnerability directly impacts compliance and audit capabilities by breaking violation reporting mechanisms and preventing proper correlation of security events against specific deployment identities. Organizations using RHACS for regulatory compliance monitoring would find their audit trails compromised as deployments appear to have no identifying information, making it impossible to track which workloads violated security policies or how violations correlate to specific applications or services within the Kubernetes environment.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery patterns, where improper handling of user-provided metadata labels creates conditions for bypassing security controls. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this represents a privilege escalation technique through resource manipulation (T1068) combined with evasion tactics (T1070) that allow adversaries to operate undetected within cluster environments while maintaining complete invisibility in security monitoring systems.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including restricting permissions for users who can create Deployments, validating all label values before processing, and implementing additional validation layers beyond the current metadata handling logic. The recommended approach involves configuring RBAC policies that prevent modification of critical labels, implementing input sanitization routines, and establishing monitoring rules that detect anomalous deployment creation patterns where identity metadata appears malformed or intentionally empty. Additionally, organizations should consider implementing automated remediation procedures that can detect and correct deployments with invalid metadata characteristics, ensuring that security controls remain effective regardless of user intent or malicious behavior.
Security teams should also establish comprehensive logging and alerting mechanisms that monitor for the specific pattern of openshift.io/encoded-deployment-config label manipulation, as this represents a clear indicator of potential exploitation attempts. Regular vulnerability assessments should include verification that all deployment identity metadata is properly validated and sanitized before being processed by the security platform, ensuring that no similar bypass opportunities exist within other metadata handling components of the system architecture.
The fundamental issue lies in the assumption that user-provided metadata labels can be trusted without proper validation, creating a dangerous trust model that allows minimal privilege users to effectively disable critical security controls. This vulnerability demonstrates the importance of defense-in-depth principles where multiple validation layers prevent single points of failure and ensure that even if one control is bypassed, other security mechanisms remain effective in protecting the overall system integrity and compliance posture.