CVE-2025-56566 in firmware
Summary
by MITRE • 09/16/2026
MikroTik firmware 7.19.4 stores sensitive authentication credentials and network state in cleartext within non-volatile storage. An attacker with physical access to the device can extract this material from an SPI flash dump, without authenticating to the device and without knowledge of the administrative password.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in MikroTik RouterOS firmware version 7.19.4 represents a critical failure in data protection mechanisms for sensitive operational data stored on non-volatile memory devices. Specifically, the system fails to encrypt or obfuscate authentication credentials and network state information when writing them to SPI flash storage. This design flaw allows any individual with physical access to the router to extract these secrets directly from the hardware without requiring prior authentication or knowledge of administrative passwords. The absence of encryption for such high-value data violates fundamental principles of secure system architecture, where sensitive material must be protected against unauthorized disclosure even if the underlying storage medium is compromised.
From a technical perspective, SPI flash memory serves as the persistent storage layer for RouterOS configurations and operational states. In this vulnerable implementation, plaintext strings containing usernames, passwords, API tokens, or cryptographic keys are written directly to specific sectors of the flash chip. An attacker can physically remove the SPI flash chip from the device using standard desoldering techniques or utilize a clip-on SOIC connector to read the memory contents via an external programmer such as an CH341A or similar hardware tool. Once extracted, the raw binary dump contains readable ASCII strings corresponding to administrative credentials and network configuration details. This process bypasses all software-based access controls because the data is not encrypted at rest, rendering authentication mechanisms ineffective against physical extraction attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it effectively nullifies the security boundary provided by password protection on MikroTik devices. An attacker with physical access can gain full administrative control over the network infrastructure managed by the affected router. This includes the ability to intercept traffic, modify routing tables, install malicious configurations, or pivot into internal networks that rely on this device for connectivity. Furthermore, because these credentials are often reused across multiple systems in enterprise environments, the compromise of a single MikroTik device can lead to lateral movement and widespread network compromise. The exposure of API tokens also poses additional risks, as these may be used by automated management tools or third-party integrations that trust the router's identity without further verification.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-312, which describes Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information, indicating a failure to apply appropriate cryptographic protections for data at rest. It also relates to CWE-798, Use of Hard-coded Credentials, if static keys are involved in the network state storage. In terms of adversary tactics, this exploitation vector corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1539, Steal Web Session Cookie, and more broadly T1005, Data from Local System, as it involves extracting sensitive data directly from local hardware components without triggering typical intrusion detection alerts associated with remote network attacks. The physical nature of the attack means that traditional perimeter defenses such as firewalls or IDS/IPS systems are ineffective in preventing this type of compromise.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Administrators should immediately update to firmware versions where MikroTik has addressed this issue by implementing encryption for sensitive data stored in non-volatile memory, ensuring that credentials are hashed or encrypted using strong algorithms such as AES-256 before being written to flash storage. Additionally, organizations must enforce strict physical security controls around network infrastructure equipment, including locked server rooms and restricted access policies, to prevent unauthorized individuals from gaining the physical proximity required for SPI flash extraction. Enabling two-factor authentication where supported adds an additional layer of defense but does not mitigate the root cause of plaintext credential exposure in storage. Regular audits of firmware versions and configuration settings are essential to maintain a secure posture against such low-level hardware attacks.