CVE-2026-92583 in AVideo
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
AVideo through 29.0 contains a race condition in the enforceRateLimit() function that fails to atomically increment rate limit counters, allowing attackers to bypass all rate limits including login brute-force protection by issuing concurrent requests. Attackers can submit parallel credential attempts to exceed the documented 30-attempts-per-5-minutes login limit by an arbitrary factor determined only by their connection concurrency.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
The vulnerability identified in AVideo versions up to and including 29.0 represents a critical failure in concurrent request handling, specifically within the enforceRateLimit() function. This flaw is classified as a race condition, which occurs when multiple threads or processes access shared data concurrently without proper synchronization mechanisms. In this specific context, the rate limiting logic relies on incrementing counters to track the number of requests made by a user or IP address over a defined time window. However, because these increments are not performed atomically, there exists a narrow but exploitable timing gap between reading the current counter value and writing back the incremented value. This non-atomic operation allows an attacker to exploit the system's inability to serialize access to the rate limit state effectively.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the lack of mutual exclusion or atomic operations when updating the session-based or IP-based counters that govern login attempts. When multiple requests are issued simultaneously from different threads or connections associated with the same target account or source IP, each thread reads the current count before any of them have written their respective increments. Consequently, all concurrent requests perceive the counter as being at its previous lower value rather than reflecting the cumulative load imposed by the parallel traffic stream. This behavior effectively neutralizes the intended throttling mechanism, rendering the rate limit configuration obsolete under conditions of high concurrency.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, particularly regarding authentication security. The documented policy restricts login attempts to thirty per five minutes for a given account or IP address. By leveraging concurrent requests, an attacker can bypass this restriction entirely and submit credential guesses at a rate limited only by their network bandwidth and the target server's capacity to process connections. This facilitates rapid brute-force attacks against user accounts, significantly reducing the time required to compromise credentials through automated guessing tools. The ability to scale attack volume arbitrarily based on concurrency makes traditional defenses ineffective without additional architectural changes or compensating controls.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-362, which describes concurrent execution using shared resources with improper synchronization leading to race conditions. Furthermore, it directly enables techniques associated with MITRE ATT&CK tactic TA0006, Credential Access, specifically subtechnique T1110.001, Brute Force: Password Guessing for Web Applications. The failure to enforce rate limits allows attackers to perform automated password guessing at a scale that overwhelms standard detection thresholds and security controls designed to mitigate such threats.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must ensure that all operations modifying shared state related to rate limiting are performed atomically. This can be achieved by using database-level locking mechanisms, atomic increment commands provided by the underlying data store, or application-level synchronization primitives such as mutexes if operating within a single process environment. For distributed deployments, implementing a centralized caching layer like Redis with atomic operations is recommended to ensure consistent state across multiple server instances. Additionally, integrating CAPTCHA challenges after a small number of failed attempts can provide an effective secondary defense against automated brute-force attacks even if rate limiting fails temporarily.