CVE-2026-92838 in GV-Remote E-Map
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
A DLL hijacking vulnerability exists in the GeoVision GV-Remote E-Map desktop application. The application loads one or more dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) from an unsafe search path, allowing a local attacker to place a malicious DLL in a location searched before the legitimate library location. If successfully exploited, an attacker with local write access to the affected directory could achieve arbitrary code execution in the security context of the GV-Remote E-Map process.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
The vulnerability identified within the GeoVision GV-Remote E-Map desktop application constitutes a classic instance of DLL hijacking, also known as DLL preloading or binary planting. This flaw arises from an insecure implementation of dynamic-link library loading mechanisms where the application fails to specify absolute paths for its dependencies. Instead, it relies on the operating system's default search order, which prioritizes directories such as the current working directory, the system directory, and other user-writable locations before checking the secure installation path. This design oversight creates a significant security gap that allows local attackers with write access to specific directories to intercept library load requests by placing maliciously crafted DLLs in those higher-priority search paths.
From a technical perspective, when the GV-Remote E-Map application starts or triggers certain functionalities, it attempts to load required dynamic libraries. Because the path resolution is not strictly controlled, the Windows loader searches for these files in locations that may be accessible to standard users. If an attacker can write a file named identically to one of the expected DLLs into any of these searched directories, the operating system will load the malicious version instead of the legitimate library provided by GeoVision. Once loaded, this rogue DLL executes within the process space of the application, inheriting all its privileges and security context. This mechanism effectively bypasses standard access controls because the execution is initiated by a trusted application running with elevated or specific user permissions.
The operational impact of successfully exploiting this vulnerability is severe, resulting in arbitrary code execution under the security context of the GV-Remote E-Map process. For an attacker possessing local write access to the affected directory, this represents a critical privilege escalation vector if the target application runs with higher privileges than the attacker's account. Even if the application runs as a standard user, the compromise allows for complete control over that session, enabling data exfiltration, installation of additional malware, or use of the compromised machine as a pivot point for further network attacks. The ability to execute arbitrary code means an adversary can manipulate system configurations, steal sensitive credentials stored by the application, or disrupt critical surveillance operations managed through the E-Map interface.
This vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID 829, which describes Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, specifically manifesting as DLL Search Order Hijacking. It also maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1574.007, known as DLL Side-Loading or Hijacking, where adversaries leverage legitimate system processes and libraries to execute malicious code undetected by security monitoring tools that typically whitelist the parent application process. The exploitation of this flaw does not require remote access, making it particularly dangerous in environments where physical or logical local access can be gained through social engineering, phishing, or compromised workstations within a trusted network segment.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict library loading practices and restricting file system permissions. Developers should update the application to use absolute paths for all DLL dependencies, ensuring that only files from verified installation directories are loaded. Implementing SafeDllSearchMode can also help by altering the search order to prioritize the System32 directory over the current working directory, although this is not a complete fix if other writable paths remain in the search chain. On the operational side, administrators should restrict write permissions on application directories and common hijacking targets such as temporary folders or user profile directories where the application might operate. Regular patching of third-party components used by the E-Map software is also essential to address any underlying library vulnerabilities that could be leveraged in conjunction with this hijacking technique.