CVE-2026-100293 in YSSD-RTMP-H5
Summary
by MITRE • 09/29/2026
In Anjvision YSSD‑RTMP‑H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4, both the local and cloud update mechanisms apply new firmware without any cryptographic verification, relying only on basic hashing. This design allows an attacker who can reach the update routine to introduce untrusted firmware images that the device will accept as valid.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2026
The vulnerability in Anjvision YSSD-RTMP-H5 firmware version 3.3.2.4 represents a critical failure in supply chain integrity and secure boot processes, specifically within both local and cloud-based update mechanisms. The core technical flaw lies in the insufficient validation of firmware images during the installation phase. Instead of employing robust cryptographic verification methods such as digital signatures using asymmetric cryptography, the system relies solely on basic hashing algorithms to verify file integrity. While a hash function can confirm that a file has not been corrupted during transmission or storage due to random bit flips, it provides no assurance regarding the origin or authenticity of the data. This distinction is fundamental in security architecture; without a digital signature verified against a trusted public key stored securely within the device's hardware or firmware, there is no mechanism to prove that the update package was generated by an authorized entity and has not been tampered with by a malicious actor during transit or while residing on local storage media.
From an operational perspective, this design flaw creates a severe attack surface for any adversary who gains network access to the device's management interface or can intercept cloud communication channels. An attacker positioned in the middle of the update process, or one with physical or logical access to the local update mechanism, can craft a malicious firmware image containing arbitrary code, backdoors, or persistent malware. Because the system only checks the hash and not the signature, it will accept this untrusted payload as valid if the attacker ensures the hash matches their crafted file structure expectations or exploits weaknesses in the hashing implementation itself. Once installed, this malicious firmware executes with the same privileges as legitimate updates, potentially granting full control over the device's operating system, network interfaces, and connected peripherals. This effectively compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the entire IoT ecosystem to which the camera is attached.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity and CWE-287 Improper Authentication, as it reflects a failure to properly verify the identity of the entity providing the update. In terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK for IoT, this flaw facilitates techniques related to Firmware Modification and Supply Chain Compromise. An attacker leveraging this vulnerability can achieve persistent remote code execution without detection by standard integrity checks that might otherwise flag unsigned binaries. The impact extends beyond individual device compromise; in environments where multiple devices are managed centrally, a compromised update server or intercepted local update could lead to widespread botnet formation or large-scale surveillance breaches, undermining the trust model of the entire deployment.
Mitigation strategies must prioritize the implementation of secure boot and signed firmware updates as industry best practices for IoT security standards like IEC 62443 and NISTIR 8259. The manufacturer should immediately patch this vulnerability by integrating a public-key infrastructure where each firmware image is digitally signed with a private key held securely by Anjvision, while the corresponding public key is embedded in read-only memory within the device hardware or bootloader. This ensures that any modification to the firmware binary will result in signature verification failure and prevent installation. Additionally, devices should enforce secure channels for cloud updates using TLS with mutual authentication where possible, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks from altering update payloads even if hashing were improved. Until such patches are deployed, administrators should restrict network access to management interfaces, monitor for unusual outbound connections indicative of command-and-control activity, and consider isolating affected devices on segmented networks to limit lateral movement in the event of a successful compromise.